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We are mindful, however, that “‘perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required.’” Montenegro, 166 N.H. at 222 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)); see also State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 297 (1986) (observing that a law is not unconstitutionally vague “merely because it could have been drafted with greater precision” (quotation omitted)); Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 281 (1987) (“An ordinance is not necessarily vague because it does not

State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 295-96 (1986); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 297 (1986); see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732-33 (2000).

Whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect and whether the crime was a product of such disease or defect are questions of fact for the jury.” The purpose of a trial court’s instruction is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.

In reviewing disputed jury instructions, we will consider them in their entirety, and reversal is not *718 warranted unless the trial court’s instructions, as a whole, fail to adequately present and explain the issues of law in the case.

We will not reverse the conviction unless the instructions did not fairly cover the issues of law in the case.

“Reversal is not warranted unless the charge, as a whole, does not fairly cover the issues of law of the case.” State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 299, 512 A.2d 1120, 1126 (1986).

Therefore, when we assess the instructions in their entirety, as we must, we find that the trial court *462 adequately informed the jury of the expert’s proper role in aiding in the determination of a defendant’s sanity.

Although RSA 167:17-b, 1(d) could perhaps have been more precisely worded, “ ‘[mathematical exactness is not required in a penal statute, nor is a law invalid merely because *401 it could have been drafted with greater precision.’” State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 297, 512 A.2d 1120, 1124 (1986) (quoting State v. Dow, 126 N.H. 205, 207, 489 A.2d 650, 651 (1985)).

that “[i]ts deliberate measured pace allows the jurors the opportunity to think about the parameters of the concept as they listen to the words,” and that “Wentworth requires an expansive, not truncated, explanation.” The purpose of the trial court’s instructions ‘“is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.’” State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 299, 512 A.2d 1120, 1126 (1986) (quoting Fletcher v. Kunze, 125 N.H. 277, 279, 480 A.2

’s requested jury instruction on a specific defense if there is some evidence to support a rational finding in favor of that defense, State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 635, 421 A.2d 124, 125 (1980); State v. Caldrain, 115 N.H. 390, 392, 342 A.2d 628, 629 (1975), but the court has no obligation to use the specific language a party requests, so long as the law is adequately stated, State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 299, 512 A.2d 1120, 1126 (1986).

State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 299, 512 A.2d 1120, 1126 (1986); State v. Bird, 122 N.H. 10, 15, 440 A.2d 441, 443 (1982).

We have previously determined that “an attacker acts with ‘extreme indifference’ when he inflicts any degree of bodily injury on a victim and when the ‘circumstances’ of the attack demonstrate a blatant disregard for the risk to the victim’s life.” State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 297, 512 A.2d 1120, 1125 (1986) (citing State v. Bailey, 127 N.H 416, 423, 503 A.2d 762, 768 (1985)).