Cited by

State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397 (1986) (finding that the weight of a prior bad act that occurred more than three years prior to the charged conduct may have been reduced “to some degree” but “its force had certainly not diminished entirely”).

Compare State v. Cassavaugh, 161 N.H. 90, 98 (2010) (threat delivered two months before victim’s murder was not so remote in time as to eliminate the requisite nexus between it and the charged event), Pepin, 156 N.H. at 278 (threat made five months before charged event was sufficiently closely connected to charged event as to be admissible), and State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 391, 397 (1986) (threat made in 1980 before the charged event in 1984 was not too remote to be admissible), with State v.

Morehouse, 120 N.H. at 741 (observing that the jury is not precluded “from reasonably inferring that the defendant 1 We note that although we were not asked to address the issue in Morehouse, we subsequently held in State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390 (1986), that the State was not required to allege and prove an attempt to commit murder of a specific variety.

State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397 (1986) (“Remoteness is one element to be considered in balancing probative value against the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence.”).

Pepin, 156 N.H. at 278 (concluding that threat made five months before charged event was not so distant in time as to ehminate the nexus between them); State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390 (1986) (concluding that threat made three years before charged event was sufficiently proximate for threat to be relevant).

is an act or omission constituting a substantial step toward,” RSA 629:1, purposely causing the death of another.

In State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397 (1986), an attempted murder case, we held that evidence of the defendant’s entry into the victim’s house with a loaded revolver, which occurred three years earlier, was admissible and relevant to prove the defendant’s intent.

State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397, 514 A.2d 1263, 1268 (1986) (finding a sufficient temporal connection between a prior bad act that occurred three and a half years prior to the charged conduct).

RSA 629:1, I; State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 392-96, 514 A.2d 1263, 1265-68 (1986) (despite statutory variants of murder, an indictment for the offense of attempted murder may plead the intended crime generally).

The substantive offense in this case, attempted murder, requires a purpose to cause the death of another.

So is other evidence of the complainant’s thought process in making such decisions, assuming a reasonable proximity in time to the charged crimes.

We therefore address this issue under our traditional tests of relevancy and prejudice, cf. State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 398, 514 A.2d 1263, 1268-69 (1986); see also N.H. R. Ev.

Although temporal proximity alone between charged and uncharged bad acts will never support a reliable inference of shared intent, time is one factor to be considered.

State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397, 514 A.2d 1263, 1268 (1986); cf. State v. Richardson, 138 N.H. 162, 167, 635 A.2d 1361, 1365 (1993) (subsequent bad act evidence “must be fairly close in time and in some significant way connected to material events constituting the crime charged”).

In State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 396, 514 A.2d 1263, 1267 (1986), we held that “attempted murder is a generic crime comprising an act committed with the purpose to cause the death of another, when that act is a substantial step toward the causation of death.” We noted that “a reference to first degree or capital murder [would be] surplusage as a ma

State v. McCue, 134 N.H. 94, 107, 589 A.2d 580, 588 (1991); State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397-98, 514 A.2d 1263, 1268 (1986).

see State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397, 514 A.2d 1263, 1268 (1986) (holding risk of prejudice resulting from admission of evidence “minimized” by remaining evidence).

This same argument was made in State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 514 A.2d 1263 (1986).

It is the obligation of counsel to request instructions limiting the scope of evidence.

State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397, 514 A.2d 1263, 1268 (1986) (temporal remoteness affects weight of probative value).

The trial court’s “decision to admit evidence of a prior bad act will constitute an abuse of discretion only if ‘clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of [the defendant’s] case.’” State v. Parker, supra at 532, 503 A.2d at 813 (quoting State v. Whitney, 125 N.H. 636, 639, 484 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1984)); State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397, 514 A.2d 1263, 1268 (1986); see State v. Hood, 127 N.H. 478, 480, 503 A.2d 781, 783 (1985).

It rests on the mistaken assumption that we rejected in State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 514 A.2d 1263 (1986), where we held that attempted murder is a generic crime, the sole mental element of which is a purpose to cause the victim’s death.