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It is settled law that a driver arrested for DWI has no constitutional right to refuse to provide a sample for a blood-alcohol test.

State v. Parmenter, 149 N.H. 40, 44 (2002); State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 256-60 (1985); RSA 265-A:10 (2014).

“Historically the privilege against compelled self- incrimination originated as a reaction to the practice in the early English courts of compelling a witness to be sworn and give testimony concerning his guilt.” State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 255 (1985) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Typically, two basic questions are raised by a self-incrimination objection: “[D]oes the evidence in question fall within the scope of evidence to which the [privilege] applies, and did the action of the State in obtaining *32 that evidence constitute compulsion.” State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 255 (1985).

State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 258 (1985) (“[A] defendant may suppress [blood alcohol test] evidence...

Like other jurisdictions, we have long said that the privilege against self-incrimination “applies only to evidence provided by a defendant that is of testimonial character.” State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 255 (1985).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, however, the refusal supports an inference that the defendant sought to suppress evidence of his guilt.

According to the defendant, while her refusal to submit to chemical testing is admissible as evidence against her at trial, State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 257-60 (1985), the court is also required to consider any explanation given by the defendant regarding the decision to decline the testing.

State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 262 (1985) (King, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting).

Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 215-16 (1988); cf. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 256, 499 A.2d 986, 988 (1985) (privilege against self-incrimination “applies only to evidence provided by a defendant that is of testimonial character”).

The defendant was told that he had the right to refuse the test, see RSA 265:92, but that such *321 refusal would result in the suspension of his driver’s license and might be admissible into evidence at trial.

Part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution protects the plaintiff from being “compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself.” The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution protects him from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” These privileges are comparable in scope.

V. The State constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is comparable in scope to the fifth amendment.

State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 258—59, 499 A.2d 986, 990-91 (1985) (permitting evidentiary use of defendant’s refusal to submit to chemical testing).

The license revocation at issue is a civil, not criminal, penalty.

Introducing evidence of an oral refusal under an implied consent law was sustained as against a self-incrimination objection under the fifth amendment in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and under part I, article 15 in State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 499 A.2d 986 (1985).

Also, we reject the plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that the State violated his rights of equal protection and due process by revoking his driver’s license for refusing to submit to a test, see State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 257, 499 A.2d 986, 989 (1985), and by failing to administer a blood or urine test to the plaintiff once it became apparent that he had chosen not to comply with the breath-alcohol testing requirements, see RSA 265:92,1 (Supp. 1988); Hallet v. Johnson, 111 N.H. 152, 153, 2

In State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 260, 499 A.2d 986, 991 (1985), this court held that the evidentiary use of a DWI defendant’s refusal to provide a sample of breath or bodily substance for chemical testing does not violate the guarantee against compelled self-incrimination provided by part I, article 15 of the State Constitution.

In State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 258, 499 A.2d 986, 989 (1985), this court stated that the chemical test was the best evidence of drunkenness and that the driver’s choice to refuse to take the test came with the attached strings that the refusal would result in a license revocation and could be introduced into evidence at trial without violating th

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 (1965); State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 255, 499 A.2d 986, 988 (1985); State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. 109, 112, 336 A.2d 244, 246 (1975).

.The defendant argues, however, that the situation has been elevated to a “critical stage” in criminal proceedings due to the enactment of RSA 265:88-a (Supp. 1985) making a refusal to take the test admissible into evidence and our upholding of that statute in State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 499 A.2d 986 (1985).

In State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 499 A.2d 986 (1985), a majority of this court held that a suspect’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test can be admitted as evidence against the suspect in a later DWI prosecution.