Cited by

Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 554 (1986) (“An indictment represents the conclusion of a grand jury that probable cause exists to believe that a defendant has committed a particular crime.”).

In the absence of a criminal conviction for the acts that allegedly constitute the good behavior violation, the State can satisfy its burden by proving “the commission of the underlying acts.” Gibbs, 157 N.H. at 540 (quotation omitted); see Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 553-54 (1986) (holding evidence of criminal indictment was insufficient, standing alone, to justify imposing suspended sentence because “[i]n the absence of a criminal 3 Although the trial court noted that it found “the lang

Rather, we have explained that the “fact-finding process should be flexible,” Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 555 (1986), because “the only inquiry is usually whether the defendant has been of good behavior or has in some way violated the terms of his freedom,” and “not to establish criminal liability,” Stapleford, 122 N.H. at 1089.

“An indictment represents the conclusion of a grand jury that probable cause exists to believe that a defendant has committed a particular crime.” Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, *722 554 (1986).

The tenant argues that the complaints have insufficient probative value and likens them to indictments, relying on Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 554 (1986).

Affording the defendant these procedures ensures “that the fact-finder will make an accurate determination on the basis of reliable evidence and verified facts.” Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 554 (1986); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484 (stating that a parole revocation hearing should be “structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior”).

Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083, 1088 (1982); Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 553 (1986); Baker, 128 N.H. at 378, 381; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole revocation deprives individual of conditional liberty).

(quotation omitted); see Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 553-54 (1986) (holding evidence of criminal indictment was insufficient, standing alone, to justify imposing suspended sentence; “[i]n the absence of a criminal conviction, the fact-finder must make an independent determination that the defendant committed the alleged violations”).

Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 554 (1986); People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 1031 (Cal.

Arnault, 114 N.H. 216, 218 (1974), and represents only the grand jury’s conclusion that probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the charged crime, Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 554 (1986).

In Moody v. Cunningham, we noted that “[t]he procedural protections of Stapleford help to ensure that the fact-finder will make an accurate determination on the basis of reliable evidence and verified facts.” Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 554, 503 A.2d 819, 822 (1986).

The State’s burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is satisfied either “by establishing the fact of a criminal conviction for the acts which constitute the violation or by proof of the commission of the underlying acts.” Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 554, 503 A.2d 819, 821 (1986).

“[T]his court is not bound by rigid rules in determining whether an appeal is moot; rather, the question of mootness is a matter of convenience and discretion.” Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 553, 503 A.2d 819, 821 (1986).

1967) (jury charge); cf. Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 554, 503 A.2d 819, 821 (1986).

Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 553, 503 A.2d 819, 821 (1986) (this court is not bound by rigid rules in determining whether an appeal is moot; it is a matter of convenience and discretion).

In Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 503 A.2d 819 (1986), the defendant points out, this court stated that “live testimony, tested by confrontation and cross-examination, is the time-honored method for achieving” accurate factual determinations.

Ass’n v. State, 115 N.H. 77, 79, 333 A.2d 713, 714 (1975); cf. Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 553, 503 A.2d 819, 821 (1986).

Mootness is not subject to rigid rules and should be regarded as a matter of convenience and discretion.

Although mootness is not an absolute bar to adjudication on appeal, see Moody v. Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 553, 503 A.2d 819, 821 (1986), this case does not present the usual considerations for reaching the merits in such circumstances.