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It would also award her 50% of the “marital portion” of Husband’s pension, calculated using the formula we announced in Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711 (1985), and would award Husband “the remaining balance in the account, including the premarital portion of the pension, free and clear of any right, title, or interest of [Wife].” Wife “explained that she is not seeking any part of [Husband’s] premarital pension specifically, but that she is seeking an ‘offset’ of oth

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (Supp. 2022)).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715–16 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16–a, I (2018)).

On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court erred by dividing his deferred compensation plan without using the formula we set forth in Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711 (1985).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 716 (1985), superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, II (2004).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715-16 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (2004)).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715-16 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (2004)).

In the Matter of Nyhan and Nyhan, 147 N.H. 768, 770 (2002) (stating IRA and 401(k) accounts not subject to Hodgins rule); cf. Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 716 (1985) superseded on other grounds by statute, RSA 458:16–a, as recognized in Nyhan, 147 N.H. at 770 (identifying formula for equitably apportioning pension benefits when actual and contingent benefits not ascertainable).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 716 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (2004).

at 667; see Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715-16 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (1992)).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 716 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (2004).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 716, 497 A.2d 1187 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (2004).

ered him to continue making weekly payments on the 2001 Toyota Camry for sixty days after entry of the final divorce decree, and until the petitioner refinanced the vehicle in her own name; (3) failed to award him certain items of personal Property; (4) awarded one-half of his retirement savings account to the petitioner without utilizing the formula set forth by this court in Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715-16 (1985), superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (1992), and without addr

Wife’s reliance upon Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715-16 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (1992)), is misplaced.

With regard to the respondent’s defined benefit pension plan, the court ordered that the respondent prepare a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) “assigning] to the Petitioner 50% of the actual retirement proceeds calculated in accordance with a Hodgins formula based on service beginning in 1981 (initial employment under the plan) and ending on August 28, 2000.” See Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (1992)).

The divorce decree mandated that “[cjounsel for the parties shall submit a Qualified Domestic Relations Order providing [the petitioner] with an interest in [the respondent’s] pensions consistent with [the Hodgins v. Hodgins] formula” and awarded the petitioner alimony.

This rule was first enunciated in Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711 (1985), and is referred to as the so-called Hodgins rule.

He argues his retirement accounts, specifically an IRA and a 401(k) account, should have been divided in accordance with the rule developed in Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711 (1985), and reiterated in subsequent cases, that “only those pension benefits which are attributable to the retiree’s employment during *697 the marriage are subject to distribution.” Rothbart v. Rothbart, 141 N.H. 71, 75 (1996) (quotation omitted).

RSA 458:16-a, I. When determining what part of a pension belongs to a party upon dissolution of the marriage, we have previously held that the trial court should apply a mathematical formula to determine what portion of the pension is attributable to employment during the marriage and thus subject to distribution.

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 714, 497 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (1992)).

The defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering the defendant’s pension in awarding alimony and distributing the known marital estate without first determining the pension’s value according to Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 497 A.2d 1187 (1985).

This property settlement case involves the apportionment of the plaintiff’s defined benefit pension plan and the interpretation of our decision in Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 497 A.2d 1187 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (1992)).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 714-15, 497 A.2d 1187, 1189-90 (1985) (vested pension rights); Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1983) (duration of marriage); Ebbert v. Ebbert, 123 N.H. 252, 255, 459 A.2d 282, 285 (1983) (tax consequences); Marsh v. Marsh, 123 N.H. 448, 450, 462 A.2d 126, 128 (1983) (age, health, stations

the court concludes that an unequal distribution of property is warranted, it should state its reasons and make specific findings and rulings supporting its decision.” Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715, 497 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1985).

This holding was based on the fact that the master did not justify the unequal distribution of property by making specific findings and stating reasons as is required following our decision in Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715, 497 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1985).

Phillip cites Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715-16, 497 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1985) in support of this argument.

The plaintiff subsequently appealed that decree to this court, and we rendered a decision relative to the property settlement rights of the parties.

The defendant next contends that the marital master misapplied the equal distribution rule of Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 497 A.2d 1187 (1985).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715, 497 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1985); RSA 458:16-a, II (Supp. 1988).

However, in the absence of special circumstances, the trial court should make the award as equal as possible.

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 714, 497 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1985); Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225-26, 459 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1983).

The defendant’s challenge to the distribution of marital assets rests on a claim of inequity under the rule of Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 714-15, 497 A.2d 1187, 1189-90 (1985), which he claims was violated by the award to him of business assets having no value exceeding encumbrances plus his premarital equity, as against distribution to the plaintiff of the marital residence with a net equity value of $112,500.

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715, 497 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1985); Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 270 (1983); see generally C. Douglas, 3 New Hampshire Practice, Family Law § 392.

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 714, 497 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1985); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 122 N.H. 339, 342, 443 A.2d 1017, 1018 (1982); Grandmaison, supra at 271, 401 A.2d at 1059; Azzi v. Azzi, 118 N.H. 653, 656, 392 A.2d 148, 150 (1978).

Because this case was decided before Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 497 A.2d 1187 (1985), the trial court was not required to make specific findings justifying any unequal division, and the order will be sustained if it can be found equitable on the total record.