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The crux of the defendant’s argument turns on the fact that children, although “assumed to consent to ordinary contacts which are reasonably necessary to the common current of life,” State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 439 (1985), are generally unable to consent to sexual contact due to immaturity, see, e.g., RSA 626:6, III (2007).

Neither option was available, however, because on these facts FSA is not a lesser included offense of AFSA, see State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 437 (1985), and because entering a nolle prosequi would have barred re-indictment on double jeopardy grounds, see State v. Pond, 133 N.H. 738, 741 (1990).

Mindful that “[(legislative enactments are construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights, and provisions may be cured through judicial construction,” State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 439 (1985) (citation omitted), we turn to the defendant’s arguments.

Because the evidence in this case *383 was circumstantial, it must exclude all rational conclusions except guilt in order to be sufficient to convict.

He argues it should not be construed to prohibit legitimate contact without a “purpose to harass, intimidate, or otherwise abuse the complainant.” To further this argument, the defendant cites RSA 633:3-a, 11(a) (Supp. 2003) as an example of a legitimate purpose exception explicitly carved out by the legislature, and State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132 (1973), and State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433 (1985), as examples of statutes that we have construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights.

The defendant bears the burden of establishing that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt.

State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985) (circumstantial evidence must exclude all rational conclusions except guilt in.order to be sufficient to convict).

The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt.

“[A] person must commit ‘sexual penetration’ to be guilty of aggravated felonious sexual assault, but to be guilty of sexual assault, he need only commit sexual contact under circumstances set forth in RSA 632-A:2 (Supp. 1979).” State v. vonKlock, 121 N.H. 697, 701, 433 A.2d 1299, 1302 (1981) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 438, 503 A.2d 774, 777 (1985).

State v. Haycock, 136 N.H. 361, 616 A.2d 481 (1992); State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985).

“The evidence in this case was circumstantial, and thus must exclude all rational conclusions except guilt in order to be sufficient to convict.” State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985); see also State v. Cobb, 123 N.H. 536, 540, 465 A.2d 1203, 1206 (1983).

State v. Pond, 133 N.H. 738, 740, 584 A.2d 770, 771 (1990) (after not pros of “knowingly” indictment, grand jury “corrected] the mens rea to ‘purposely’”); State v. Hickey, 129 N.H. 53, 61, 523 A.2d 60, 65 (1986) (defendant “was charged with acting purposely”); State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985) (defendant “must have purposely engaged in sexual penetration”); State v. Shute, 122 N.H. 498, 504, 446 A.2d 1162, 1165 (1982) (indictment charged defendant did “‘purposely engag

When there is conflicting testimony, we defer to the findings of the jury unless no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion.

We will defer to the trial court’s determination on witness credibility “unless we find that no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion after weighing the conflicting testimony.” State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 437, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985).

The defendant has the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt.

State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436-37, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985); Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 94, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1982).

State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985); State v. Burke, 122 N.H. 565, 569, 448 A.2d 962, 964 (1982).

For this court to overturn the trial court’s decision, the defendant must establish “that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” See State v. Murray, 129 N.H. 645, 650, 531 A.2d 323, 327 (1987); see also State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985).

ered in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendant coerced the victim on September 13, 1985].’” State v. Meekins, 127 N.H. 777, 778, 508 A.2d 1048, 1049 (1986) (quoting State v. Boire, 124 N.H. 622, 625, 474 A.2d 568, 570 (1984)); accord, State v. LaCasse, supra at 653, 531 A.2d at 328-29; State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436-37, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985).

On appeal, “the defendánt has the burden to demonstrate that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Murray, 129 N.H. 645, 650, 531 A.2d 323, 325 (1987); State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985); accord, State v. Meloon, 124 N.H. 257, 259, 469 A.2d 1316, 1318 (1983).

To sustain this challenge, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion, State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985), that no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the evidence most favorably to the State, State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 12, 480 A.2d 854, *773 860 (1984), that the defendant engaged in “some reflection and consideration upon the.

Under the familiar standards that we apply, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Keeping in mind that “[t]he essence of a jury’s function is to determine the weight and credence to be given the evidence at trial,” State v. Meaney, 129 N.H. 448, 451, 529 A.2d 384, 386 (1987), this court will defer to the jury’s determination unless no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion after weighing the conflicting evidence, State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436-37, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985).

The State correctly notes that on appeal the defendant has the burden to show that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court will defer to the determination of the trier of fact unless no reasonable person could have *370 arrived at the same conclusion after weighing the conflicting evidence.

A statute is void for overbreadth “if it *451 attempts to control [conduct] by means which invade areas of protected freedom.” State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 439, 503 A.2d 774, 778 (1985); see State v. Wong, 125 N.H. at 622, 486 A.2d at 269; see also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (“a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means wh