Cited by

Even if the argument were preserved, however, we have noted a “distinction between cases dealing with evidence that was withheld, but is still in the government’s control,” to which Brady, Laurie, and their progeny apply, and “cases dealing with evidence that was lost or destroyed.” State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 544-45 (1986); see Laurie, 139 N.H. at 329.

State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 543-44 (1986) (reviewing trial court’s denial of defendant’s request to allow counsel to withdraw from the case under abuse of discretion standard); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining that we now refer to abuse of discretion standard as unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

“Although the trial court made no express finding on the issue of culpable negligence, the evidentiary record of what is known about the loss of evidence is sufficient to indicate that there was none.” State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 547 (1985).

State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 543-44 (1986) (reviewing trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s request to allow counsel to withdraw from the case under abuse of discretion standard); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining that we now refer to abuse of discretion standard as unsustainable exercise of discretion standard); see al

In the context of discovery requests, the information sought is material to guilt or punishment if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

If the prior allegations were false, they would adversely affect the victims’ credibility See State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 549, 506 A.2d 699, 706 (1986).

The State urges us to rely on State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 506 A.2d 699 (1986), to determine that the State standard is no more protective than the federal standard for materiality of Brady evidence.

State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 543, 506 A.2d 699, 703 (1986); State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 879-80, 379 A.2d 813, 822 (1977).

In essence, the defendant was claiming that the victim had falsely claimed rape after prior consensual sexual activity.” The facts in the present case are similar to those in State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 548-49, 506 A.2d 699, 706-07 (1986), where the trial court denied the defendant’s request to order discovery of a statement given by the victim to an examining physician that she had been raped in the past but had not reported it.

As a related matter, it is also arguable that in failing to object contemporaneously to the testimony claimed to be inadmissible the defendant failed to preserve these issues for review.

Although we have begun to develop a body of State law dealing with the interests affected by the government’s loss or destruction of relevant evidence, see State v. Baillargeon, 127 N.H. 782, 508 A.2d 1051 (1986); State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 545-46, 506 A.2d 699, 704-05 (1986), we have had no prior occasion to consider the constitutional significance of destruction by a third party.

In State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 543, 506 A.2d 699, 702 (1986), we noted that the public defender had resisted Dukette’s insistence that Settle be allowed to participate in preparation for the trial of the case.

Because federal law is no more advantageous to the defendant, as many of our foregoing citations indicate, we similarly find no basis for relief under the Constitution of the United States.

The State maintains initially that the defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal, citing State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 506 A.2d 699 (1986).

riminal trial is lost or destroyed, the court must examine three factors in order to ascertain whether the defendant’s due process rights have been violated: (1) whether the State acted in good faith when it lost or destroyed the evidence; (2) whether the evidence was material to the defendant’s guilt or degree of punishment; and (3) whether the defendant was prejudiced by its loss or destruction.