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*122 Witnesses, including law enforcement officers, have been permitted to testify about their opinion on topics such as smell, State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 621-22 (1985) (officer permitted to testify that a jacket smelled of kerosene), appearance, State v. McCue, 134 N.H. 94, 107 (1991) (officer permitted to “opine” that impressions at crime scene were “drag marks”), and sound, Heath v. Joyce, 114 N.H. 620, 622 (1974) (lay witness permitted to testify that a noise sound

“[P]rior convictions are admissible to impeach a defendant even if the crimes do not directly involve a lack of veracity.” State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625 (1985).

The defendant argues that this case is governed by State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 495 A.2d 1258 (1985), and does not fall within the exception to Rule 608 discussed in the more recent State v. Mello, 137 N.H. 597, 631 A.2d 146 (1993).

This determination is a matter of discretion for the trial court, State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625, 495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985), which we will not disturb absent an abuse of that discretion.

State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 622, 495 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1985) (quoting State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982)).

Dukette, 127 N.H. at 549, 506 A.2d at 707; see also State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 623, 495 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1985) (collateral facts may not be proven by contradictory third-party testimony).

State v. Steer, 128 N.H. 490, 492, 517 A.2d 797, 799 (1986); State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 621-22, 495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985).

Given their lack of probative value and their prejudicial effect, it would have been an abuse of discretion, State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625, 495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985), to permit the defendant to introduce into evidence the nondescript facts found in the Hunter documents.

“It is New Hampshire practice to allow inquiry into collateral issues by cross-examination for impeachment purposes; however, the cross-examiner must take the answer and may not call other witnesses to rebut it.” State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 623, 495 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1985).

The defendant addresses the general rule that admission of relevant evidence is subject to trial court discretion after weighing its probative value and prejudicial potential, see State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625, 495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985), by claiming that the ruling in question was an abuse of discretion “[i]n light of the sequestration order,” with which it was said to be inconsistent.

We find no abuse of discretion, see State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625, 495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985), in the court’s implicit finding that the probative value of the evidence of the threat was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ____” N.H. R. Ev.

This court has consistently held that whether evidence is relevant, and thus admissible for that reason, is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

However, this court has also consistently held that whether or not to admit relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

State v. Whitney, 125 N.H. 636, 639, 484 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1984); State v. Sullivan, 121 N.H. 301, 303-04, 428 A.2d 1247, 1249 (1981); State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625, 495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985).

State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625 495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985); State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 307, 386 A.2d 808, 815 (1978).