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RSA 628:2,1, provides, in pertinent part, “A person who is insane at the time he acts is not criminally responsible for his conduct.” Insanity is an affirmative defense in New Hampshire.

See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966 (1979); see also State v. Plante, 134 N.H. 456, 460-62 *593 (1991); State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 448-49 (1985); State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152 (1980).

Evidence which goes to a point upon which no evidence was adduced at the former trial is not cumulative.” State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 450, 503 A.2d 791, 795 (1985) (quotations, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).

“The question of whether a new trial should be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence is a question of fact for the trial court.” State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 450, 503 A.2d 791, 795 (1985).

State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 450, 503 A.2d 791, 795 (1985) (citations and quotations omitted).

See, e.g., Plante, 134 N.H. at 461, 594 A.2d at 1283 (“whether [the] acts are a product of mental illness or disease”); State v. Shackford, 127 N.H. 695, 701, 506 A.2d 315, 318 (1986) (“whether the act was the offspring of insanity: if it was, a criminal intent did not produce it”); State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 448-49, 503 A.2d 791, 794 (1985) (“whether an individual had a *253 mental disease, and whether an act was the product of that disease”); State v. Sadvari, 123 N.H. 410, 414, 462 A.2d 1

motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the moving party must show “(1) that [he] was not at fault for not discovering the evidence at the former trial; (2) that the evidence is admissible, material to the merits, and not cumulative; and (3) that [the evidence is] of such a character that a different result will probably be reached upon another trial.” State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 450, 503 A.2d 791, 795 (1985) (citations and quotations omitted).

newly discovered evidence, the defendant must establish the following in the trial court: “(1) that [she] was not at fault for not discovering the evidence at the former trial; (2) that the evidence is admissible..., material to the merits, and not cumulative; and (3) that [the evidence is] of such a character that a different result will probably be reached upon another trial.” State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 450, 503 A.2d 791, 795 (1985) (citations and quotations omitted).

Since Jones, the common law in New Hampshire has treated the issue of a defendant’s mental capacity, and the question of whether his or her acts are a product of mental illness or disease, as questions of fact to be determined by the jury.

On the other hand, once a verdict has been reached, the moving party bears a much heavier burden since it must show, inter alia, “that a different result will probably be reached upon another trial.” State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 450, 503 A.2d 791, 795 (1985) (citations omitted).

We considered and decided this issue in State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 503 A.2d 791 (1985).

There is, however, a presumption against each, in the sense that a defendant carries the burden to demonstrate reversible error, State v. Foster, 80 N.H. 1, 6, 113 A. 211, 214 (1921), or other entitlement to a new trial, State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 450, 503 A.2d 791, 795 (1985).

(Citations omitted.)” Kelly, supra at 906, 424 A.2d at 822 (quoting Burroughs v. Wynn, 117 N.H. 123, 126, 370 A.2d 642, 644 (1977); Rautenberg v. Munnis, 109 N.H. 25, 26, 241 A.2d 375, 376 (1968)); see State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 503 A.2d 791 (1985).

We recently held that the rule does not violate due process, in State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 503 A.2d 791 (1985), and therefore decline to further address this issue.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain this burden, we must “view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the state.” State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 447, 503 A.2d 791, 794 (1985).