Cited by

State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 55 (1985) (stating that defendant consistently asserted right to speedy trial when, in space of three months, he objected to two of State’s requests for continuance and moved to dismiss for lack of speedy trial).

id.; but see State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 54 (1985) (finding, after defendant was convicted in de novo trial in superior court, that he had been denied speedy trial in district court).

We have previously held that the period of time ends with the commencement of trial.

“This court puts substantial emphasis on the latter two of the Barker factors.” State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 55 (1985) (quotation omitted).

In cases where we have examined the scope of the right to a speedy trial in criminal proceedings, we based our analysis upon the date upon which trial commenced.

The record does not reveal that the defendant objected to the trial date, see State v. Tucker, 132 N.H. 31, 33, 561 A.2d 1075, 1077 (1989), and the vicissitudes of scheduling do not cut in favor of a defendant to a great degree anyway, see Colbath, 130 N.H. at 319, 540 A.2d at 1213; State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 54-55, 498 A.2d 731, 735 (1985).

State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 53, 498 A.2d 731, 733 (1985) (holding that delay in bringing defendant to trial in district court for misdemeanor offense and delay in bringing trial de novo in superior court should be considered separately).

The question in all such cases is whether the pretrial delay at issue was reasonable.

The delays in this case due to an overcrowded docket and scheduling difficulties are indeed held against the State, but to a lesser extent than would be a deliberate delay.

State v. Colbath, supra at 319, 540 A.2d at 1213 (in felony case, delay beyond nine months assumed to warrant review); cf. State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 54, 498 A.2d 731, 734 (1985) (in misdemeanor case, ten-month delay presumptively prejudicial).

Be that as it may, we place substantial emphasis on the facts relevant under the two remaining factors, see State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 55, 498 A.2d 731, 735 (1985), which militate against awarding relief.

Ball, supra at 232, 471 A.2d *428 at 351; see also State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 51-52, 498 A.2d 731, 733 (1985).

That provision is the source of the State’s speedy trial requirement, State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 51, 498 A.2d 731, 733 (1985); State v. White, 116 N.H. 687, 688, 366 A.2d 872, 873 (1976), and there are close analogies between considerations that underlie the guarantee of speedy trial and those that support the demand for speedy disposition.