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e advised the employer of a dispute involving a claim, and the employer did not pay it, failure to pay the claim [was] ‘willful and without good cause.’” The liquidated damages statute, RSA 275:44, IV (2010), “was not intended to impose liability where the employer’s refusal to pay wages is based upon bona fide belief that he is not obligated to pay them.” Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 801 (1985).

at 52-53; Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 801-02 (1985).

By contrast, the Town argues that we should rely upon our previous interpretation of “willful” conduct in the context of a claim for liquidated damages under RSA chapter 275, concluding that willful means “a voluntary act committed with an intent to cause its results.” Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 801 (1985).

The employer invites us to overrule Galloway, arguing that it is “inherently unworkable” because it conflicts with Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 803-04 (1985).

In certain contexts, we have defined a “willful act” as a “voluntary act committed with an intent to cause its results.” Miller v. Slania Enters., 150 N.H. 655, 662 (2004) (regarding landlord-tenant matter); Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 801 (1985) (regarding employment matter).

Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 800 (1985) (holding that agreed-upon profit sharing “fall[s] within [RSA 275:42, Ill’s] reference to compensation calculated on some ‘other basis’” notwithstanding that the profit-sharing agreement “did not provide a stated date or certain time for payment of the share”); Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 756-5

Moreover, this is not a case such as Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796 (1985), in which the trial court accepted one party’s version of a commission agreement over the version propounded by the other party, see id.

Corp., 150 N.H. 141, 146 (2003) (quotation omitted); see also Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 802 (1985).

We have construed “willfully and without good cause” as “a single phrase meaning voluntarily, with knowledge that the wages are owed and despite financial ability to pay them.” Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 802 (1985); accord Richmond v. Hutchinson, 149 N.H. 749, 751 (2003) (defining “willfully”).

this section, such employer shall be additionally liable to the employee for liquidated damages.” We have defined “willfully,” in the context of an action for unpaid wages due under employment contracts, “to mean voluntarily, with knowledge of the obligation and despite the financial ability to pay it.” Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 801 (1985).

Thus, for instance, in Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 801 (1985) (citation omitted), we stated, “A willful act is a voluntary act committed with an intent to cause its results.

allow costs of the action, and reasonable attorney’s fees”); Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 804, 498 A.2d 297, 303 (1985) (court must award fees when it finds a wage claim meritorious, unless it finds particular facts that would render such an award inequitable).

Next, the petitioner argues the board erred in defining willful as “the absence of showing circumstances beyond a person’s control,” contrary to our holding in Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 498 A.2d 297 (1985).

Ives v. Manchester Suburu, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 802-03, 498 A.2d 297, 302 (1985) (remanding for a determination of willfulness based on court’s holding that disputed sums constituted wages under statute).

Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 799, 498 A.2d 297, 300 (1985).

Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 498 A.2d 297 (1985) (employee suit for unpaid wages); see also Howard, 120 N.H. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274 (the proper remedy for unlawful age discrimination is provided for by statute).

Although this ruling is dispositive of the case, we will address the defendant’s other issues, which are likely to arise again in this or other cases.