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“Under RSA chapter 100-A, [NHRS] provides benefits for service retirement, disability retirement and accidental death to eligible members and beneficiaries.” N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 107 (1985).

Moreover, “the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference.” N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108 (1985).

N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 109 (1985) (“[T]he long- standing practical and plausible interpretation [of a statute] applied by the agency responsible for its implementation, without any interference by the legislature, is evidence that the administrative construction conforms to the legislative intent.” (quotation omitted)); see also Appeal of

Ctr., 134 N.H. 207, 219 (1991) (“[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference.” (quotation omitted)); N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108 (1985) (“[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference.”).

RSA 188-F:6, XI (Supp. 2010); RSA 4:15 (2003); N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104 (1985).

We have noted that, when interpreting a statute, “the long-standing practical and plausible interpretation applied by the agency responsible for its implementation, without any interference by the legislature, is evidence that the administrative construction conforms to the legislative intent.” N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 109 (1985) (quotations omitted).

Furthermore, we defer to the board’s interpretation, finding that it is reasonable and consistent with the language of other regulations governing the transfer of rehabilitation beds, the language of RSA chapter 151-C, and the purpose that the regulations were intended to serve.

N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108-09 (1985) (court defers to long-standing practical interpretation given statute by administrative entity without legislative interference when meaning of statute in doubt).

While statutory construction by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference, see N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108 (1985), the interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court.

Laws 1973, 218:2, IV, V; see N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 109 (1985).

Even a “long-standing administrative interpretation of a statute is irrelevant” if that interpretation clearly conflicts with express statutory language.

“Under the common law of trusts, the [board] owes the [NHRS] members and beneficiaries a fiduciary obligation to manage the [NHRS] for the benefit of its members and beneficiaries.” N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 109, 489 A.2d 615, 619 (1985).

Where statutory language is ambiguous, as in this case, we examine the statute’s overall objective, and give substantial deference to the interpretation of those charged with its administration.

Our conclusion is consistent with our decision in New Hampshire Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 489 A.2d 615 (1985), where we held that although established by statute, the retirement system is an independent entity rather than an executive department or agency.

“[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference.” N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108, 489 A.2d 615, 618 (1985).

Assoc’s of N.E., 131 N.H. 560, 565-66, 556 A.2d 1183, 1187 (1989); N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 109, 489 A.2d 615, 619 (1985); Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).

“[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference.” Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977); N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108, 489 A.2d 615, 618 (1985).

[In fact a]n administrative interpretation may be persuasive.” N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108, 489 A.2d 615, 618 (1985) (citations omitted).