Cited by

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217 (1985).

Likewise, we disagree with the City’s argument that PSNH’s abatement application “relate[d] solely to the assessment of PSNH’s regulated electric utility property” and, thus, the “mere mention of” the office building in the abatement application was insufficient “to invoke the BTLA’s jurisdiction to abate the value of that parcel.” See Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 216 (1985); RSA 76:16-a.

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 216 (1985); see RSA 71-B:5, I (2012) (providing the BTLA with “power and authority.

Phetteplace v. Town of Lyme, 144 N.H. 621, 625 (2000) (holding that compliance with procedural deadline for filing appeal is a “necessary prerequisite” to establishing jurisdiction in the appellate body); Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 216 (1985) (holding that BTLA lacked jurisdiction to order abatement on one parcel where property owner applied only for abatement on a different parcel).

The board notes the parties take conflicting positions on this issue based on several lines of authority, including Appeal of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217 (1985), cited by the City, and the board’s August 26, 2008 ‘Wal-Mart” Order, submitted as Taxpayer Exhibit No. 2.

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217 (1985) (quotation and citation omitted).

In Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214 (1985), we reversed the BTLA’s order reducing the town’s assessment where the property owner failed to file for an abatement.

Assuming this distinction is both plausible and relevant, the taxpayers “had the burden of proving that [their] taxable properties] w[ere] in the aggregate overvalued and the total assessments] excessive.” Crown Paper Co. v. City of Berlin, 142 N.H. 563, 569 (1997) (emphases added); see Appeal of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217 (1985); Amoskeag Mfg.

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217 (1985).

However, “[j]ustice does not require the correction of errors of valuation whose joint effect is not injurious to the appellant.” Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985) (quotation omitted).

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 216, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 216, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

RSA 76:17; see Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 216, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 216, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

fact based on information outside the scope of evidence presented at the hearing and not capable of being judicially noticed; (2) violated RSA 541-A:18, V(b) (Supp. 1993) by making findings based on extraneous evidence without providing the city with notice that it intended to rely on the extraneous evidence; and (3) misapplied the burden of proof standard set forth in Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 489 A.2d 153 (1985), by failing to require the plaintiffs to produce evidence on the va

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 218, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

Widespread disproportionality is no defense.” Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 219, 489 A.2d 153, 156 (1985).

*313 “The powers of the board and the rights of taxpayers appearing before the board are entirely statutory and are limited by the terms of the statute.” Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 216, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

Co. v. Manchester, 70 N.H. 200, 46 A. 470 (1899), and recently in Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985).

Therefore, in order to obtain relief on the ground that its property was assessed “at a higher percentage of fair market value than the percentage at which property [was] generally assessed in the [city],” Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985), the taxpayer had the burden to prove that the city’s valuation exceeded fair market value.

in the town,” Appeal of Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 217, 489 A.2d 153, 155 (1985), but it argues that this rule does not authorize a town or the board to assess all of the taxpayer’s real estate as if it were one parcel.