Cited by

State v. Dalling, 159 N.H. 183, 187 (2009); State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 814 (1984).

at 610-11; see also State v. Mouser, 168 N.H. 19, 25 (2015) (holding that parking area behind defendant’s multi-family residence was not part of the curtilage in part because the parking area “was available for the shared benefit” of the residents (quotation omitted)); State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 816 (1984) (stating in dicta that “common areas of an apartment building.

See, e.g., State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 817 (1984) (When officers executed a search warrant at defendant’s apartment and an officer remained at the apartment for the purpose of arresting the defendant, that officer’s conduct “constituted a search for the defendant within his home.” (emphasis added)).

The solicitous protection that the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions afford to the home must be preserved because “[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to *309 retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 816-18 (1984) (quotation omitted) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).

Again, in State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 819, 486 A.2d 297, 304 (1984), we held that the defendant’s right to be free from an unreasonable seizure under part I, article 19 had been violated and ordered that “any evidence obtained in violation of this right cannot be *386 used at trial.” See also State v. Silvestri, 136 N.H. 522, 528, 618 A.2d 821, 824 (19

If an arrest had occurred, evidence independent of the post-arrest statements must have existed to provide probable cause for the arrest.

Investigators could, therefore, search for signs of ignition near the propane tank and water heater and then continue to search the garage and breezeway area for evidence pertaining to the use and ignition of accelerants.

denied, 483 U.S. 1008 (1988); see State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 814, 486 A.2d 297, 300 (1984); State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 311, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982).

Justice requires that being denied the only viable defense, the motion be granted, and all evidence of the [breath test] be suppressed.” We will not overturn the district court’s ruling unless it is erroneous as a matter of law.

The State concedes that the defendant’s right to counsel had attached as of September, 1986, see State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983); State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 28-29, 458 A.2d 95, 101-02 (1983), appeal after remand, 125 N.H. 810, 486 A.2d 297 (1984).

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 814-15, 486 A.2d 297, 301 (1984); State v. Tapply, 124 N.H. 318, 325, 470 A.2d 900, 905 (1983).

State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 814, 486 A.2d 297, 300 (1984) (because disputed statements are not material, the court need not address claim that they were made with reckless falsity).

The issue of an omission’s materiality is a “[question] of law, for which this court is ultimately responsible.” State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 814, 486 A.2d 297, 300 (1984); see also State v. Cote, 126 N.H. 514, 522, 493 A.2d 1170, 1175-76 (1985).

The court held an in camera hearing to investigate the chief’s veracity, of the sort contemplated by Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 486 A.2d 297 (1984).

We have stated that “whether an affidavit contains a misrepresentation and whether the misrepresentation was material are questions of law, for which this court is ultimately responsible, while the issue of willfulness or recklessness of the misrepresentation is a question of fact for the trial court, which we will not overturn if the finding is supported by the evidence.” State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 814, 486 A.2d 297, 300 (1984).

State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 817-18, 486 A.2d 297, 302-03 (1984) (citing State v. Morse, 125 N.H. 403, 409, 480 A.2d 183, 187 (1984) (decided under Federal constitutional law); and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980)); see N.H. Const, pt.

If the evidence in question has been obtained only through the exploitation of an antecedent illegality, it must be suppressed.

He thus raises a “fruit of the poisonous tree” claim, that the seizure of *595 evidence was tainted by the illegality of his original detention.

State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 814, 486 A.2d 297, 300 (1984) (misrepresentation not material where accurate rendition of information would not have detracted from informant’s credibility).

See, e.g., State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 486 A.2d 297 (1984); State v. Tapply, 124 N.H. 318, 470 A.2d 900 (1983); State v. Palamia, 124 N.H. 333, 470 A.2d 906 (1983); State v. Birmingham, 122 N.H. 1169, 453 A.2d 1329 (1982).

The court accordingly ordered suppression of the evidentiary fruits of the Varagianis’ wiretap.

State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 819, 486 A.2d 297, 304 (1984) (any evidence obtained in violation of the right to be free from unreasonable seizures cannot be used at trial); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).