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The title of a statute is not conclusive of its interpretation, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will not consider the title in determining the meaning of the statute.

Companies, 143 N.H. 270, 274 (1998) (“‘The title of a statute is not conclusive of its interpretation, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous this court will not consider the title in determining the meaning of the statute.’” (quoting State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 742 (1984))).

The petitioner asserts that the intent of the statute, correctly interpreted, “is to address the issue of fraud as the law is titled.” The Board counters that “[t]he title of a statute is not conclusive of its interpretation, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous this court will not consider the title in determining the meaning of the statute.” State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 742 (1984).

RSA 641:5, I; Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 241.6(1), at 162-63 (1985); cf. State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 743 (1984) (“[T]he New Hampshire Legislature excluded the terms ‘witness’ and ‘informant’ used in the Model Penal Code provision on witness tampering, and instead used the broader term ‘person.’”).

[w]ithhold any testimony, information, document or thing”); State v. Moscone, 161 N.H. 355, 359 (2011) (explaining that in State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 743 (1984), “[w]e concluded, without analysis, that the trial court used the proper mens rea 5 when it instructed the jury that ‘the defendant had to act purposely when he attempted to get a person to give the police false information.’ Since Kilgus, we have required a pur

next argues that paragraph III applies only to claims secured by liens because RSA 167:16 is entitled, “Enforcement of Assistance Liens.” As we have previously held, however, “[t]he title of a statute is not conclusive of its interpretation, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous this court will not consider the title in determining the meaning of the statute.” State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 742 (1984).

In State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 743 (1984), the defendant was convicted of witness tampering pursuant to RSA 641:5, 1(a) (2007), which states, “A person is guilty of a class B felony if.

The State cites Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974), and State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 745 (1984), for the proposition that the State and Federal Constitutions do not protect intentionally false statements of material fact.

tute is “Payment for Second Injuries from Special Fund,” the text does not mention the term “second injury,” but instead requires only “subsequent disability.” RSA 281:47-a, I. “The title of a statute is not conclusive of its interpretation, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous this court will not consider the title in determining the meaning of the statute.” State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 742, 484 A.2d 1208, 1212 (1984).

In support of this argument, the plaintiff points out that RSA 215-A:34 is entitled “Posted Land.” While the title of a statute may be persuasive, it is not conclusive of its interpretation.

The witness tampering statute “protects an important public interest in discovering the truth in official proceedings and investigations.” State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 745, 484 A.2d 1208, 1213 (1984).

Our imposition of such qualifiers would be impermissible judicial construction.

As we have previously noted, “[w]hen the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by judicial construction.” State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 742, 484 A.2d 1208, 1211 (1984) (quoting State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 462, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (1983)).

Therefore, we need not consider the title of the statutory provision in determining the meaning of the statute.

State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 484 A.2d 1208 (1984) (upholding the witness tampering conviction).

owing argument: (1) one is guilty of a crime only if he acts “purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently” with respect to each material element of the offense, RSA 626:2,1; (2) although RSA 641:5, I, does not specify which of these culpable mental states applies to the offense of wit *800 ness tampering, in such a case the State must prove that the defendant acted purposely, State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 743, 484 A.2d 1208, 1212 (1984); see State v. Aldrich, 124 N.H. 43, 466 A.2d 938 (1983

State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 742, 484 A.2d 1208, 1212 (1984) (citing In re Vernon E., 121 N.H. 836, 841, 435 A.2d 833, 836 (1981)).

Moreover, we find no compelling intent manifested by the use of the technically limited term “tortfeasor” in the title of RSA 507:7-b which would require us to disregard the plainly expansive language of the text of the statute.