Cited by

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 678 (1985) (“Consequential damages are reasonably foreseeable losses that flow from a breach of contract.”).

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 683 (1985) (explaining that, in a civil case, whether to reconvene the jury five days after the close of trial was “within the sound discretion of the trial court”); State v. Low, 138 N.H. 86, 88 (1993) (holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by de

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 683 (1985) (upholding reconvening of jury where juror told defense attorney jury improperly calculated amount of damages); Bunnell, 126 N.H. at 665, 669 (finding reconvening jury proper where juror informed plaintiff’s counsel jury reached decision by averaging their respective determinations of fault and foreman fai

Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins.

Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins.

The affidavit was thus inadmissible as an evidentiary basis for setting aside the jury verdict, and the trial court was permitted to consider it only “to determine whether the jury should be reconvened for questioning on the propriety of the conduct of their deliberations.” Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins.

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 678 (1985), the plaintiff must prove that her damages were sustained as a result of the defendant’s breach.

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 683, 496 A.2d 339, 346 (1985) (noting that where jury assigns burden of proof to wrong party, who then loses, case must be resubmitted to jury for reconsideration).

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 678, 496 A.2d 339, 342 (1985) (citation and quotation omitted).

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 680-81, 496 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1985); Town of Milford v. Johnson, 122 N.H. 875, 876, 451 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982); Paquette v. St.

Indian Head National Bank v. Corey, supra at 87, 523 A.2d at 72; see also Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins.

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 681, 496 A.2d 339, 344 (1985), as the conditions for de novo review of the trial court’s determinations are not present here, see Grendel’s Den v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1st Cir. 1984).

Co., 126 N.H. 674, 496 A.2d 339 (1985), we reaffirmed the longstanding authority of the trial courts to recall and interrogate the jury on the propriety of the conduct of its deliberations.