Cited by

Martin, 171 N.H. at 593; State v. Ayer, 150 N.H. 14, 25-26 (2003) (describing the right to counsel and the right to self-representation as “antithetical”); State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 636 (1985) (“This right to self-representation does not coexist with that of a defendant to be represented by counsel.

se the assistance of counsel and self-represent at trial.3 Accordingly, we have previously upheld a defendant’s right to waive his right to the assistance of counsel at trial, provided the defendant evinces an understanding of that right and asserts an unequivocal desire to relinquish it.4 See State v. Towle, 162 N.H. 799, 803 (2011); State v. Thomas, 150 N.H. 327, 328-29 (2003); State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 639 (1985).

State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 516 (2006); see State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 636 (1985); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).

“There are no mechanical tests to determine when due process has been violated by the denial of a continuance, but in each case the totality of the circumstances must be considered.” State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 880 (1977); see State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 640 (1985); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (“There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.”).

On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a “penetrating and comprehensive” Faretta colloquy before allowing him to proceed pro se at trial, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 884-35 (1975); cf. State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 637-38 (1985), and by denying his request for a transcript of his earlier suppression hearing to use for impeachment purposes at trial.

Neither constitution provides a right to hybrid representation, where a defendant acts either as co-counsel, see State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 638 (1985), or “ehoreograph[s] special *26 appearances by counsel.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183.

The constitutional right to trial by jury “is one of central and fundamental importance,” State v. Hewitt, 128 N.H. 557, 558 (1986), and courts do not presume acquiescence in the waiver of such a right, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 637 (1985).

I, art. 15; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975); State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 636, 495 A.2d 1269, 1273 (1985), habeas corpus dismissed sub nom.

State v. Lister, 119 N.H. 713, 716, 406 A.2d 967, 969 *190 (1979) (Lister I); State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 636, 495 A.2d 1269, 1273 (1985), habeas corpus dismissed sub nom.

In order to represent himself, the accused must “‘knowingly and intelligently’ relinquish ‘the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.’ ” State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 637, 495 A.2d 1269, 1273 (1985), habeas corpus dismissed, 895 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.), cert.

‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (footnotes omitted); State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 637, 495 A.2d 1269, 1273 (1985); see State v. Tapley, 124 N.H. 318, 322, 470 A.2d 900, 903 (1983).

Whether to grant or deny a continuance is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will not reverse a denial of a continuance unless we find that the trial court has abused its discretion.

The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on motions to continue, and we will not reverse the ruling absent an abuse of discretion.

Where the defendant has had ample opportunity to subpoena a witness but fails to do so, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to continue.