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RSA 630:3, I (2007), II; see also State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 618-20 (1984) (explaining that, under RSA 630:3, I, II, the culpability requirement of negligent homicide may be satisfied either by showing that a person caused the death of another negligently or by establishing that the person caused the death in the course of driving while under the influence).

A criminal statute is void for vagueness when it forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that *203 men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

RSA 630:3, II; State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 620 (1984) (to sustain a conviction under RSA 630:3, II, the State must establish a causal connection between the person’s driving under the influence, the subsequent collision and the resulting death).

The trial court concluded that the defendant was arrested for a felony and impliedly consented to the blood draws that were seized pursuant to probable cause and exigency.

When an officer is trying to obtain a blood sample at night and the evidence is time sensitive, however, locating a magistrate risks destruction of the evidence.

State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 628 (1984) (decided under federal law).

The second negligent homicide offense does not enumerate a culpable mental state because we have ruled that driving a propelled vehicle while intoxicated “is criminally negligent per se.” State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 620 (1984).

State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 622 (1984) (rejecting overbreadth argument where, “[i]n prohibiting a person from causing *436 death as a consequence of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, [the statute] does not infringe a protected freedom”).

th regard to the defendant’s expert that “the reasons he gave in support of his opinion were not sound and that the other medical evidence within this case substantially outweighed the opinion expressed by Dr. *611 Laposata.” The trial court, as the trier of fact, was free to evaluate the various experts’ credibility, to resolve conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State, see State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 625, 486 A.2d 262, 272 (1984), and in doing so “reject any inferences urged by the def

Proof of the valium indictment, however, does not require proof of negligence.

Laws 1981, 543:5 (“The general court declares that driving while intoxicated is a deplorable act which shows wanton disregard for the rights of others to safely use our highways.”); cf. State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 619, 486 A.2d 262, 268 (1984) (concluding that operating an automobile while in a state of intoxication is per se negligence).

State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 622, 486 A.2d 262, 270 (1984) (legislature has constitutionally recognized authority to define criminal acts).

State v. Wright, 126 N.H. 643, 646, 496 A.2d 702, 703 (1985); State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 623, 486 A.2d 262, 270 (1984).

In determining whether the jury was so entitled, we recognize that it may draw all reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, just as it may from direct evidence.

Exigent circumstances exist when the delay entailed by the obtaining of a search warrant would create a “substantial threat of imminent danger to life or public safety,” Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. at 578, 409 A.2d at 1139, or there is a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed, State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 630, 486 A.2d 262, 274 (1984).

it is the province of the jury to decide whether the evidence as a whole supports the material elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 624, 486 A.2d 262, 271 (1984).

This court has consistently acknowledged the importance of obtaining a timely blood alcohol test, see State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 626, 486 A.2d 262, 272 (1984); State v. Schneider, 124 N.H. 242, 245, 470 A.2d 887, 889 (1983); Harlan v. State, 113 N.H. 194, 197, 308 A.2d 856, 858 (1973).

While we have noted that indictments must conform to the requirements of part I, article 15 of the New *476 Hampshire Constitution, see State v. Erickson, 129 N.H. 515, 518-19, 533 A.2d 23, 24-25 (1987), we have also found that harmless surplusage does not invalidate the constitutionality of indictments, State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 623, 486 A.2d 262, 270 (1984).

State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982); State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 624, 486 A.2d 262, 271 (1984); State v. Cyr, 122 N.H. 1155, 1160, 453 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1982).

The standard simply stated is “whether men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute’s] meaning and differ as to its application.” State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 621, 486 A.2d 262, 269 (1984); see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973).

In addition, “[t]he question of whether an intoxication test is operated properly is for the trial court to determine on the basis of the evidence before it.” State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 626-27, 486 A.2d 262, 273 (1984) (citing State v. Roberts, 102 N.H. 414, 417, 158 A.2d 458, 460 (I960)).

The scope of RSA 265:92,1 (formerly RSA 262-A:62-e (Supp. 1979)) thus has been narrowed so that a person arrested for negligent homicide no longer has a statutory right to have a refusal to consent to a blood alcohol content test serve as a basis for excluding the results of the test.

In State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 486 A.2d 262 (1984), we held that “a person who is proven to have driven an automobile while intoxicated is criminally negligent per se.