Cited by

Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 5 (1985) (holding that “the critical fact prompting final disciplinary action is not the fact of conviction or indictment, but the underlying conduct giving rise to that indictment or conviction” (citation omitted)).

*367 We next consider the numerous mitigating factors present in this case.

falsely answering bar counsel’s interrogatory”); Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 2-3 (1985) (attorney disbarred where his trust account was out of trust by more than $70,000.00, he lied at his disciplinary hearing and failed to notify the PCC or this court that he had been arrested for grand theft); Jones’ Case, 137 N.H. 351, 353-56, 360-61 (1993) (attorney disbarred where, against client’s instr

Thus, for instance, in Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 2 (1985), we disbarred an attorney because, among other things, his trust account was out of trust by more than $70,000.

While we consider mitigating factors when determining appropriate disciplinary action, the existence of such factors does not necessarily preclude disbarment for protection of the public.

at 607, 594 A.2d at 170; Flint’s Case, 133 N.H. at 691, 582 A.2d at 294; Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 6, 489 A.2d 571, 574 (1985), those cases involved additional and repeated misconduct, including the respondents’ failure to cooperate with the professional conduct committee.

denied, 109 S. Ct. 1103 (1989); Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 3-4, 489 A.2d 571, 572 (1985); Mussman’s Case, supra at 412, 286 A.2d at 620; see Barnard’s Case supra (quoting Welanko’s Case, 99 N.H. 413, 414, 112 A.2d 50, 51 (1955)).

This court is obligated to consider mitigating circumstances.

For these reasons, we may suspend or disbar an attorney “as necessary to protect the public and the integrity of the legal profession.” Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 3-4, 489 A.2d 571, 572 (1985); see RSA 311:8.

We are empowered either to suspend or to disbar an attorney “as necessary to protect the public and the integrity of the legal profession.” Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 3-4, 489 A.2d 571, 572 (1985); see RSA 311:8.

“In determining the discipline to be imposed in a given case, this court must consider mitigating factors.” Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 6, 489 A.2d 571, 574 (1985) (citing Mussman’s Case, 111 N.H. at 412, 286 A.2d at 620).

Carroll’s Case, 127 N.H. 390, 393, 503 A.2d 750, 751 (1985); Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 4, 489 A.2d 571, 572 (1985).

Most recently, however, we have ordered disbarment, Carroll’s Case, 127 N.H. 390, 503 A.2d 750 (1985); Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 489 A.2d 571 (1985), and we have expressed our considered judgment in the rule that “[ojrdinarily, the misuse of a client’s funds justifies disbarment.” Carroll’s Case, 127 N.H. at 393, 503 A.2d at 753 (citations omitted).

Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 4, 489 A.2d 571, 574 (1985); Harrington’s Case, 100 N.H. 243, 244, 123 A.2d 396, 396 (1956).