Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Dover Professional Fire Officers Ass'n v. City of Dover, 470 A.2d 866.

15 citing documents.

  • State v. Place 582 A.2d 616 N.H. 1990
    RSA 21:2; State v. Hart, 130 N.H. 325, 326, 540 A.2d 859, 859 (1988) (quoting Dover Professional Fire Officers Ass’n v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 868-69 (1983)).
  • Lemm Development Corp. v. Town of Bartlett 580 A.2d 1082 N.H. 1990
    v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 868 (1983), but “[w]here the [regulation] defines the term in issue, that definition will govern,” Trottier, 117 N.H. at 150, 370 A.2d at 277.
  • Chroniak v. Golden Investment Corp. 577 A.2d 1209 N.H. 1990
    v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 868-69 (1983) (quoting State Employees’ Ass’n of N.H. v. Bd.
  • State v. Powell 567 A.2d 568 N.H. 1989
    of Trustees, 120 N.H. 272, 273, 415 A.2d 665, 666 (1980)....” Dover Professional Fire Officers Assoc.
  • Appeal of Cremin 554 A.2d 1298 N.H. 1989
    v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 868-69 (1983), we open the enquiry by asking whether the entitlement provisions of RSA 99:2(c) (Supp. 1979) (since repealed) were plain in their meaning and whether they encompassed the petitioners.
  • Town of Rye v. Public Service Co. 540 A.2d 1233 N.H. 1988
    v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 868 (1983); Sutherland Stat Const § 46.01 (4th ed. 1984).
  • State v. Hart 540 A.2d 859 N.H. 1988
    We first look to RSA 259:60, I, which defines a motor vehicle as “[e]xcept where otherwise specified in this title, any self propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on stationary tracks....” In Dover Professional Fire Officers Association v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 868-69 (1983), we stated: “‘In any case involving the interpretation of a statute, the starting point must be the language of the statute itself.’ State Employees’ Ass’n of N.H. v. Bd.
  • Concord Steam Corp. v. City of Concord 519 A.2d 266 N.H. 1986
    Dover Professional Fire Officers Assoc.
  • Bradley Real Estate Trust v. Taylor 515 A.2d 1212 N.H. 1986
    v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 869 (1983) (quoting Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980)).
  • Weldy v. Town of Kingston 514 A.2d 1257 N.H. 1986
    Dover Professional Fire Officers Assoc.
  • State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State 503 A.2d 829 N.H. 1986
    Dover Professional Fire Officers Assoc.
  • Appeal of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League 497 A.2d 847 N.H. 1985
    v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 868-69 (1983); RSA 21:2.
  • Leavitt v. Hamelin 495 A.2d 1286 N.H. 1985
    Dover Professional Fire Officers Assoc.
  • Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Service, Inc. 484 A.2d 1101 N.H. 1984
    v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 868-69 (1983); Hurley v. Public Service Co. of N.H., 123 N.H. 750, 754, 465 A.2d 1217, 1220 (1983).
  • Followed Maguire v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance 480 A.2d 112 N.H. 1984
    We are bound by the “plain and unambiguous” language of the statute before us. Dover Professional Fire Officials Assoc.