Cited by

Relying upon our decisions in Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590 (1981) and Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175 (1984), the plaintiff argues that a finding of bad faith is not required for an award of attorney’s fees in inverse condemnation cases, and that the trial court erred in denying her request for attorney’s fees by requiring a specific finding of bad faith.

“It is well established in this State that cities and towns have only those powers which are granted to them by the legislature.” Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 181 (1984).

We finally note that the appellants rely in part upon Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175 (1984), in support of their position.

We finally note that the appellants rely in part upon Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 480 A.2d 71 (1984), in support of their position.

He cites Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 182 (1984) (quotation, brackets and ellipses omitted), for the proposition that “a past use creates vested rights to a similar future use, so that a town may not unreasonably require the discontinuance of a nonconforming use.” Although Dugas was a dispute over attorney’s fees and costs, it arose out of a takings clai

He cites Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 182, 480 A.2d 71 (1984) (quotation, brackets and ellipses omitted), for the proposition that "a past use creates vested rights to a similar future use, so that a town may not unreasonably require the discontinuance of a nonconforming use."

Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 183, 480 A.2d 71, 76 (1984) (distinguishing unconstitutional abuse of power from mere “erroneous application of a valid zoning regulation or some arcane procedural error” for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees).

Municipalities have only “powers [that] are expressly granted to them by the legislature and such as are necessarily implied or incidental thereto.” Girard v. Town of Allenstown, 121 N.H. 268, 271, 428 A.2d 488, 489 (1981) (quotation omitted); see also Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 181, 480 A.2d 71, 75 (1984).

See, e.g., Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 182-83, 480 A.2d 71, 76 (1984).

denied, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 1560 (1992); Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 181-83, 480 A.2d 71, 75-76 (1984).

The owners cite Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 480 A.2d 71 (1984), for an exception to the American rule that may entitle a claimant to an award of fees: “[A] citizen should not be compelled to bear the financial burden of judicial intervention to secure his [or her] clearly defined and established property right from an unconstitutional abuse of power found to

Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 181, 480 A.2d 71, 75 (1984).

In most cases zoning regulations and proceedings thereunder will not amount to unconstitutional abuses of power.’” Town of Chesterfield, 126 N.H. at 68, 489 A.2d at 603 (quoting Dugas v. Town *324 of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 182, 480 A.2d 71, 75 (1984)).

Relying upon Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 181, 480 A.2d 71, 75 (1984), the court reasoned that the City had only those powers granted to it by the legislature and that “the City has provided no authority by which [it could,] acting in the role of planning board or building inspector[,].

delegated power can only do so in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute.’” Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 181, 480 A.2d 71, 75 (1984) (quoting Town of Tuftonboro v. Lakeside Colony, Inc., 119 N.H. 445, 448, 403 A.2d 410, 412 (1979)) (citations omitted).

In most cases zoning regulations and proceedings thereunder will not amount to unconstitutional abuses of power.” Dugas v. Town of Conway, 125 N.H. 175, 182, 480 A.2d 71, 75 (1984).