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Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Service, Inc., 484 A.2d 1101.

20 citing documents.

  • John C. Rankin & a. v. South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc. South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc. v. TruexCullins … N.H. 2019
    Finally, South Street argues that the words “all actions” in RSA 508:4-b cannot be read to include actions for indemnity and/or contribution without violating the rule that “all of the words of a statute must be given effect and that the legislature is presumed not to have used superfluous or redundant words.” Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543 (1984).
  • Natalie Anderson v. Adam Robitaille 205 A.3d 1105 N.H. 2019
    Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 542-43 (1984).
  • State Employees Ass'n Local 1984 v. New Hampshire Division of Personnel 965 A.2d 1116 N.H. 2009
    We also note the “elementary principle of statutory construction that all of the words of a statute must be given effect and that the legislature is presumed not to have used superfluous or redundant words.” Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543 (1984).
  • Boyle v. City of Portsmouth 910 A.2d 1229 N.H. 2006
    Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543 (1984).
  • Winnacunnet Cooperative School District v. Town of Seabrook 809 A.2d 1270 N.H. 2002
    Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543 (1984).
  • Allstate Insurance v. Armstrong 738 A.2d 1280 N.H. 1999
    Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984) (all words of statute must be given effect; legislature not presumed to use superfluous words).
  • Hannigan v. City of Concord 738 A.2d 1262 N.H. 1999
    1978) (holding that introductory definition of accessory use would be rendered “mere surplusage” if list of accessory uses were deemed exclusive); see also Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984) (legislature presumed not to have used superfluous or redundant words).
  • Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead School District 733 A.2d 394 N.H. 1999
    Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984).
  • New Hampshire Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Pitco Frialator, Inc. 705 A.2d 1190 N.H. 1998
    A construction of the statute that equated “claimant” with “insured” or “policyholder” would contravene the fundamental principles “that all of the words of a statute must be given effect and that the legislature is presumed not to have used superfluous or redundant words.” Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984).
  • In re Thomas M. 676 A.2d 113 N.H. 1996
    At the end of subparagraph (b), preceding subparagraph (c), is the word “or.” Thus, each subparagraph of RSA 169-C:3, XIX is, independently, a definition of “neglected child.” See Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984).
  • Appeal of Derry Education Ass'n 635 A.2d 465 N.H. 1993
    the submission of the fact-finder’s report, but only allows the legislative body to “vote to accept or reject so much of his recommendations as otherwise is permitted by law.” Basic statutory construction rules require that “all of the words of a statute must be given effect and that the legislature is presumed not to have used superfluous or redundant words.” Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984).
  • State v. Gagnon 600 A.2d 937 N.H. 1991
    Although our policy is to avoid examination of legislative history where the statute is not ambiguous, see Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 542, 484 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1984), we note briefly that money was saved here because once the misdemeanor charge was reduced to a violation, Gagnon was no longer entitled to a court-appointed attorney.
  • Cohen v. Town of Henniker 593 A.2d 1145 N.H. 1991
    Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984) (all of the words of a statute must be given effect); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. 612, 623 (1849) (“[o]ne portion of a statute *429 should not be construed to annul or destroy what has been clearly granted by another”).
  • New England Brickmaster, Inc. v. Town of Salem 582 A.2d 601 N.H. 1990
    Therefore, Brickmaster argues, interpreting RSA 674:44 to grant the same power at the site plan approval stage would render those provisions “redundant or superfluous.” See Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984).
  • Blanchard v. Blanchard 578 A.2d 339 N.H. 1990
    “We will examine the *431 legislative intent and the legislation’s objectives only when construing an ambiguous statute.” Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 542, 484 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1984).
  • In re Sprague 564 A.2d 829 N.H. 1989
    [to be] separately stated.” Since we assume that the legislature would not have included a provision which is mere surplusage, see Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984), we read the provision to require a ruling on each proposed finding, so long as the requests are not unduly excessive.
  • Town of Wolfeboro v. Smith 556 A.2d 755 N.H. 1989
    Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984).
  • Town of Windham v. Alfond 523 A.2d 42 N.H. 1986
    Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984) (statutory construction must consider entire statute, since all words must be given effect).
  • In re Richard M. 497 A.2d 1200 N.H. 1985
    “We will examine the legislative intent and the legislation’s objectives only when construing an ambiguous statute.” Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 542, 484 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1984).
  • State v. Riley 490 A.2d 1362 N.H. 1985
    .” Merrill v. *266 Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 543, 484 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1984).