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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Brodeur, 493 A.2d 1134.

22 citing documents.

  • State v. Sean McInnis 169 N.H. 565 N.H. 2017
    An investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion is such an exception.
  • State v. Beauchesne 868 A.2d 972 N.H. 2005
    An investigatory stop is a very limited seizure.
  • State v. Blake 766 A.2d 725 N.H. 2001
    The officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415 (1985) (quotation omitted).
  • DeMauro v. DeMauro 712 A.2d 623 N.H. 1998
    State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 416, 493 A.2d 1134, 1138 (1985) (quotation omitted) (concluding criminal defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege).
  • State v. McBreairty 697 A.2d 495 N.H. 1997
    See, e.g., State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 416, 493 A.2d 1134, 1138 (1985); cf. RSA 594:13 (1986).
  • State v. Smith 681 A.2d 1215 N.H. 1996
    Moreover, we have adopted the holding of Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, see State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1985), which is the foundation for Buie and Daoust, see Buie, 494 U.S. at 331-34; Daoust, 916 F.2d at 759.
  • State v. Hood 679 A.2d 594 N.H. 1996
    The officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.” State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1985) (quotation omitted).
  • State v. Roach 677 A.2d 157 N.H. 1996
    Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (scope of search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible); State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1985).
  • State v. Noel 628 A.2d 692 N.H. 1993
    Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1980); State v. Reid, 135 N.H. 376, 380, 605 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1992); State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1985); Maya, 126 N.H at 595, 493 A.2d at 1143-44.
  • State v. Reid 605 A.2d 1050 N.H. 1992
    As the defendant correctly recognizes, “the police may temporarily detain a suspect for investigatory purposes, on grounds that do not amount to probable cause to arrest him for the commission of a crime.” Id.; see also State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
  • State v. Kennison 590 A.2d 1099 N.H. 1991
    Moreover, we require *247 the officer to “‘be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’” State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
  • State v. Zurita 584 A.2d 758 N.H. 1990
    The order of the court denying the motion to suppress reflects a decision based not on any single factor but, correctly, on the totality of factors that evidenced the defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.
  • State v. Pellicci 580 A.2d 710 N.H. 1990
    State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1985) (adopting the rule established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 26-27 (1968), that under some circumstances police may detain a person for investigatory purposes on grounds not amounting to probable cause to arrest).
  • State v. Glaude 552 A.2d 85 N.H. 1988
    In State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 493 A.2d 1134 (1985), we adopted the rule first enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
  • State v. Chaloux 546 A.2d 1081 N.H. 1988
    Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 27 (1968); see State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1985).
  • State v. Torres 540 A.2d 1217 N.H. 1988
    Relying on State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 493 A.2d 1134 (1985) and State v. Bushey, 122 N.H. 995, 453 A.2d 1265 (1982), the trial court denied the suppression motion, finding that (1) Torres had been given his Miranda rights, (2) Torres had not asserted either his right to remain silent or his right to counsel, (3) his statements had been made voluntarily
  • State v. Otero 529 A.2d 381 N.H. 1987
    Thus, we need only consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the defendant’s allegedly inaccurate statement into evidence.
  • State v. DeGrenier 517 A.2d 814 N.H. 1986
    The defendant concedes that the police had reasonable suspicion to justify stopping him after he left the apartment building.
  • State v. Parker 503 A.2d 809 N.H. 1985
    State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 416, 493 A.2d 1134, 1138 (1985); N.H. Const, pt.
  • State v. Oxley 503 A.2d 756 N.H. 1985
    United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680-81 (1985); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 146, 149 (1972); State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1985); State v. Landry, supra at 290-91, 358 A.2d at 664.
  • State v. Camargo 498 A.2d 292 N.H. 1985
    State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 415-16, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1985); see also Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
  • State v. Maya 493 A.2d 1139 N.H. 1985
    State v. Brodeur, 126 N.H. 411, 493 A.2d 1134 (1985); State v. Riley, 126 N.H. 257, 490 A.2d 1362 (1985).