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llegations against him “without regard to whether he waived his Miranda rights.” See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 (1987) (noting that the Supreme Court has never held, and declined to hold in that case, “that mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject matter of an interrogation is ‘trickery’ sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights”); State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 493 (1984) (noting that Miranda “states no requirement to warn about the specific char

State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494 (1984) (distinguishing “the perspective of lawyers from that of jurors” in the context of jury instructions).

Compare State v. Bundy, 130 N.H. 382, 383 (1988) (“Under the facts of this case, the trial court’s supplemental charge could not possibly have invaded the jury’s exclusive fact-finding province.”) with State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494 (1984) (finding that a judge’s instruction probably had the effect of superseding the exercise of the jurors’ own judgment contrary to Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire.Constitution).

“[W]hether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.” Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514; see State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494 (1984); State v. Dingman, 144 N.H. 113, 115 (1999).

State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494 (1984) (whether defendant did not sign confession because it was untrue was factual issue for jury to *754 decide).

We conclude that the trial judge “invaded the exclusive province of the jury to decide what facts are proved by competent evidence.” State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984) (quotation omitted).

State v. Stayman, 138 N.H. 397, 400, 640 A.2d 771, 773 (1994); State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984).

Had the trial court answered in the negative, the jury might have understood the response to remove nullification from their consideration.

Because a plaintiff otherwise entitled to a jury trial has a right to have all factual issues resolved by the jury, see State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984), the procedure in the proposed bill violates part I, article 20.

State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984); State v. Bushey, 122 N.H. 995, 999, 453 A.2d 1265, 1267 (1982).

The State was required to show that the defendant actually understood his rights, see State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984), and that his decision to waive his rights was “based upon some appreciation of the consequences of the decision.” State v. Bushey, 122 N.H. 995, 999, 453 A.2d 1265, 1267 (1982).

State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984) (court’s response created realistic danger that jury misled by mistaking answer to legal question for definitive answer to factual issue).

The defendant also relies on State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 517 A.2d 848 (1986), and State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 484 A.2d 1070 (1984), in support of his argument.

The instruction must be judged as a reasonable juror would probably have understood it, see State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984), and the defendant’s position must be evaluated in the context of the whole charge and in light of all the evidence in the case, State v. Bundy, 130 N.H. 382, 539 A.2d 713 (1988).

In contrast, in State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 484 A.2d 1070 (1984), upon which the defendant relies, the jurors asked the court for a supplementary instruction concerning whether “the lack of a signature on Mr. Jones’ statement [meant] a complete denial of the *384 statement.” Id.

“The signature or lack of it is merely one of those circumstances” which the trial court looks at when reviewing the “totality of the circumstances.” State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 493, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984).

The defendant maintains *668 that the court invaded the province of the jury, as the exclusive finder of fact, see State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984), when it explained that the jury need not be concerned with proof of penetration as an element of the aggravated felonious sexual assaúlt charges, because the defendant had admitted that element as alleged in each count of the indictment.