Cited by

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 558 (1984).

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 558 (1984).

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 558 (1984).

In the absence of a party’s request, the court is not obligated to make specific findings, see Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 558 (1984), and we will assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its ruling, see Prop.

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 558 (1984).

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1984); Sanderson v. Balfour, 109 N.H. 213, 216, 247 A.2d 185, 187 (1968).

We need not decide whether these requirements should be relaxed for purely legal issues, however, because the interpretation of restrictive covenants requires a finding of intent, see Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 359, 341 A.2d 782, 784 (1975), and as such involves mixed questions of fact and law, “a common subject of collateral estoppel,” Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 555, 484 A.2d 1106, 1112 (1984).

default, none of the issues is actually litigated.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, comment e at 257 (1980); see also Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 557, 484 A.2d 1106, 1113 (1984).

*359 Under conditions to be discussed below, collateral estoppel may be invoked to bar a party to a prior final judgment from relitigating any fact actually determined in the prior litigation, see Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554-55, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111-12 (1984).

Although a superior court justice sitting without a jury is generally under no obligation to make findings and rulings in support of a decree unless a party asks for them, see Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 558, 484 A.2d 1106, 1114 (1984), when either party does request them, RSA 491:15 requires a statement of facts and legal rulings in jury-waived and non-jury cases heard in accordance with RSA 491:13 and RSA 491:14, respectively.

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554-55, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1984); Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978).

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111-12 (1984).

In re Alfred P., 126 N.H. 628, 629, 495 A.2d 1264, 1265 (1985); Morgenroth v. State, 126 N.H. 266, 270, 490 A.2d 784, 786 (1985); Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1984).

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 553, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1984).

For its modern form, see Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111-12 (1984); Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253-54, 387 A.2d 321, 323-24 (1978).

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 553, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1984) (citing *762 V.S.H.

Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation by a party in a later action of any matter actually litigated in a prior action in which he or someone in privity with him was a party.

by a party to a later case who was not a party or in privity with a party to the earlier case.” Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1984).