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“When there is no other remedy, this court may exercise its supervisory powers and countermand, by means of a writ of prohibition, a trial court’s order which is not supported by any legal authority.” State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 462 (1983).

State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 465 (1983) (suppression of any evidence obtained in violation of the Right of Privacy Act is proper remedy).

State v. Williams, 143 N.H. 559, 561 (1999); State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 464 (1983).

State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 465 (1983) (holding that because suppression of illegally obtained evidence is a form of injunctive relief, suppression of defendant’s bank records *488 obtained in violation of RSA chapter 359-C is an appropriate remedy).

In light of the obvious objectives of the legislation and under the circumstances of the case, we further conclude that suppression is an appropriate remedy for the State’s statutory violation.

Because the language of the prior rule is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by judicial construction.

“When there is no other remedy, this court may exercise its supervisory powers and countermand, by means of a writ of prohibition, a trial court’s order which is not supported by any legal authority.” State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 459, 462, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (1983).

Cf State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 465, 464 A.2d 268, 273 (1983) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of Privacy Act, RSA chapter 359-C, is appropriate remedy to vindicate purposes behind the statute).

In evaluating whether a party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the plaintiff suffered a legal injury against which the law was designed to protect.

As we have previously noted, “[w]hen the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by judicial construction.” State v. Kilgus, 125 N.H. 739, 742, 484 A.2d 1208, 1211 (1984) (quoting State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 462, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (1983)).

to read, and examine the text of a statute and draw inferences concerning its meaning from its composition and structure.” State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 462, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (1983).

RSA 359-C: 2, II; State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 464, 464 A.2d 268, 273 (1983).

Accordingly, we must countermand the order of the superior court and grant the State’s petition for a writ of prohibition.

“Although the legislature is not compelled to follow technical rules of grammar and composition, a widely accepted method of statutory construction is to read and examine the text of the statute and draw inferences concerning its meaning from its composition and structure.” State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 462, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (1983).

“When the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by judicial construction.” State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 462, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (1983); RSA 21:2.

“When the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by judicial construction.” State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 462, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (1983).

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 485; State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 467, 464 A.2d 268, 274 (1983); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

In seeking the intent of the legislature, we will consider the language and the structure of the statute.

State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 463, 464 A.2d 268, 272 (1983) (a judge must determine whether there is probable cause prior to issuing a subpoena for bank records under RSA chapter 359-C (Supp. 1981), regardless of a grand jury finding of probable cause) (but cf. Laws 1983, 174:6, amending RSA 359-C: 10, II).

As we held in State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 465, 464 A.2d 268, 274 (1983), the suppression of any evidence obtained in violation of the Privacy Act is an appropriate remedy to vindicate the purpose behind the legislature’s passage of the Privacy Act.

When construing an ambiguous statute, we look at both the legislative intent and the objective of the legislation.