Cited by

White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77 (1983); see RSA 80:20-:38 (2012) (setting forth tax sale procedure).

Also, we will not construe a statute as unconstitutional “where it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.” White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78 (1983).

First NH Bank, 138 N.H. at 327-28; White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 74 (1983); Manchester v. Straw, 86 N.H. 390, 393 (1933).

th and families (DCYF) central registry, perpetrator must be provided written notice of the report on which the allegations are based and the reasons for DCYF’s determination, access to pertinent DCYF documents, the right to challenge the determination at an administrative hearing, and, if the determination is upheld, a written post-hearing statement of the grounds for such ruling); White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77 (1983) (in order to avoid ruling that tax sale procedures violated due process right

Thus, a statute will not be construed to be unconstitutional when it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.

As such, a statute will not be construed to be unconstitutional when it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.

As such, a statute will not be construed to be unconstitutional when it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.

RSA 74:1 (Supp. 2009) (selectmen of each town must “take an inventory of all estate liable to be taxed in such town as of April 1”); White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69,76 (1983) (“Assessment of the tax is performed annually by each city and town, based upon their property inventory as of April 1.”).

A statute will not be construed to be unconstitutional where it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.

Although “[a] statute will not be construed to be unconstitutional, where it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional,” White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78 (1983), we elect not to make the State’s arguments for it.

The Due Process Clause of the State Constitution requires that, prior to any proceeding involving the deprivation of significant property rights, “the State must provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 75-76 (1983) (quotation omitted).

Furthermore, statutes “should be construed so as to effectuate their evident purpose.” White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 74, 470 A.2d 849, 852 (1983) (quotation omitted).

The statutory tax lien procedure at that time did not impose an obligation on the town to conduct a title search at or near the date it issued a tax deed, cf. White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 76, 470 A.2d 849, 853 (1983), and, in fact, imposed no duty to search record title other than in conjunction with the actual tax lien notice.

The statutory scheme of our tax collection law, including RSA 80:39, provides a fundamentally fair procedure.

Right of a Mortgage Holder Where Notice Not Adequate We agree, however, that a mortgage will survive tax deeds if the town fails to provide all the notice the law requires.

Following the presumption that all legislative enactments are intended to comply with constitutional strictures, see White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78, 470 A.2d 849, 854 (1983), we hold that the legislature intended the traffic violations adjudicable under this mail-in procedure to be civil in nature.

We will not place a literal interpretation on a phrase when doing so removes it from the context of the whole, State ex rel Fortin v. Harris, 109 N.H. 394, 395, 253 A.2d 830, 830-31 (1969), nor will we construe a statute as unconstitutional where it is susceptible of a constitutional construction, White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78, 470 A.2d 849, 854 (1983), but we will not modify the meaning of a statute that is plain on its face, Appeal of Cremin, 131 N.H. 480, 483, 554 A.2d 1298, 1300 (1989).

We will construe statutes “so as to effectuate their evident purpose.” State v. Sweeney, 90 N.H. 127, 128, 5 A.2d 41, 41 (1939), quoted in White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 74, 470 A.2d 849, 852 (1983).

In fact, in light of our previous determination that RSA chapter 80, when read in conjunction with the notice requirements mandated therein, is indeed constitutional, White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 78, 470 A.2d 849, 854 (1983), any such challenge would have been futile.

While it is true that we will not construe a statute in a manner that renders it unconstitutional where it is susceptible of a reading to the contrary, White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78, 470 A.2d 849, 854 (1983), this does not mean that we must, in the alternative, construe the constitution in a manner that yields the same result.

White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78, 470 *22 A.2d 849, 854 (1983) (statute construed to be constitutional where susceptible to such a construction).

The language of part I, article 23 is crystal clear: “Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust.” We look next at the regulations, attempting to read them in a way that does not contradict constitutional principles.

White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 75-76, 470 A.2d 849, 853 (1983) (State and federal due process rights require notice and opportunity to be heard prior to any proceeding that will be accorded finality in deprivation of property rights).

We will interpret a statute as constitutional where it is susceptible to such a construction.

The department cites White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78, 470 A.2d 849, 854 (1983) for the proposition that a statute will not be construed to be unconstitutional where it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.

The defendant Sprague further argues that even assuming arguendo that the whole of the property was subject to sale, the transfer was invalid because he was never given proper notice of the sale as required by RSA 80:21 and:27 (Supp. 1985).

Given our recognition of the sig *691 nificant substantive rights of plaintiffs in survival actions, Gould, supra at 409, 493 A.2d at 1196, we invoke the familiar principle that “[a] statute will not be construed to be unconstitutional, where it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.” White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78, 470 A.2d 849, 854 (1983) (citations omitted).

In the first, we state that “‘[a] statute will not be construed to be unconstitutional where it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.’” City of Claremont v. Truell, 126 N.H. 30, 39, 489 A.2d 581, 588 (1985) (quoting White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 77-78, 470 A.2d 849, 854 (1983)); see also Jarvis v. Claremont, 83 N.H. 176, 180, 139 A. 747, 749 (1927); Canaan v. District, 74 N.H. 517, 529-30, 70 A. 250, 254 (1908).

From the context of its usage in RSA 236:91, II with “junked” and “dismantled,” we can infer that a wrecked automobile may be something different from one that has been through a process of junking or dismantling, but beyond that we must look to common usage, RSA 21:2, and the evident purpose of the statute, White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 74, 470 A.2d 849, 852 (1983).

Assoc., Inc., 122 N.H. 484, 490, 446 A.2d 462, 466 (1982); White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 75, 470 A.2d 849, 853 (1983).