Cited by

With respect to either doctrine, the fact that the “door has been opened” does not permit all evidence to “pass through” because the doctrine is intended to prevent prejudice and is not to be subverted into a vehicle for the introduction of prejudice.

Recognizing the inherent differences between children and adults, the legislature “has provided for special treatment of juveniles under the juvenile justice statute.” State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 12 (1985).

ere he was involved in disturbances, criminal mischief and reckless conduct.” E.G. filed a motion to suppress, among other things, “all evidence obtained in violation of [his] right against self-incrimination.” Specifically, he contended that he had been subjected to custodial interrogation by Garcia without having been informed of his rights in accordance with Miranda and State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6 (1985).

Bassett, J. The State appeals an order of the Circuit Court {Sullivan, J.) granting the motion of the juvenile, B.C., to suppress a statement obtained in violation of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6 (1985).

They then read him his Miranda rights, using a simplified form for juveniles known as a Benoit form, see State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 22-24 (1985).

“The fact that the door has been opened does not, by itself, permit all evidence to pass through.” State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 21 (1985).

Under that doctrine, a trial judge has discretion to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to rebut prejudicial evidence that has already been erroneously admitted.

Whether a waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary is determined by the totality of the circumstances.

“The New Hampshire Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant protection from involuntary self-incrimination.” State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 14 (1985); see N.H. CONST. pt.

This case is similar to State v. Benoit, in which the defendant asked the court for a ruling, in the nature of a motion in limine, that, if he questioned the victim regarding her inability to identify him on the day of the robbery, he would open the door for inquiry by the State into a line-up identification which had been suppressed.

Finally, by recognizing the inherent differences between children and adults, our legislature “has provided for special treatment of juveniles under the juvenile justice statute.” State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 12 (1985).

Specifically, he argued that the State failed to prove that he waived his constitutional rights in conformity with State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 490 A.2d 295 (1985).

Thus, the State argues, the jury was left with the misimpression that “the defendant’s threats came out of the blue, in the context of an otherwise caring relationship.” The “opening-the-door” doctrine permits a trial judge, in his or her discretion, to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut prejudicial evidence that has been admitted.

He gave Wesley some juice, read his rights to him from the juvenile Miranda form, see State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 22-24, 490 A.2d 295, 306-07 (1985), and proceeded to inquire about the fire and its discovery.

We strongly urge that this form be amended to include an express waiver.

The General Court, recognizing inherent differences between children and adults, has provided for special treatment of juveniles under RSA chapter 169-B.

The defendant contends that the district court failed to inform him of his rights and protections as a juvenile and the consequences of adult criminal treatment as required by State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 18-19, 490 A.2d 295, 304 (1985).

The defendant next contends that the district court erred in admitting the defendant’s confession because the police obtained it in violation of this court’s holding in State v. Benoit.

State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 12, 490 A.2d 295, 299 (1985) (quotations, brackets, and emphasis omitted).

This rule prevents a defendant from successfully excluding inadmissible evidence favorable to the State and “then selectively introducing pieces of this evidence for his own advantage, without allowing the prosecution to place the evidence in its proper context.” State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 20, 490 A.2d 295, 305 (1985) (quotation omitted).

The doctrine is to prevent prejudice and is not to be subverted into a rule for injection of prejudice.” State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 21, 490 A.2d 295, 306 (1985) (quotation omitted; emphasis added).

State v. Stetson, 135 N.H. 267, 269, 603 A.2d 498, 499 (1992) (defendant gained misleading advantage when hearsay evidence admitted into evidence); see also State v. Judkins, 128 N.H. 223, 225, 512 A.2d 427, 428-29 (1986); State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 21, 490 A.2d 295, 305 (1985); State v. Brown, 125 N.H. 346, 351-52, 480 A.2d 901, 905-06 (1984); State v. Butler, 117 N.H. 888, 891-92, 379 A.2d 827, 829-30 (1977).

State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 21, 490 A.2d 295, 306 (1985); cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986); Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1992), cert.

State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 524, 567 A.2d 544, 546 (1990); see State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 21, 490 A.2d 295, 306 (1985); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).

The State concedes the point, but argues that the evidence was admissible to dissipate a misleading advantage under the “opening-the-door” doctrine recognized in State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 21, 490 A.2d 295, 305 (1985), or that its admission was harmless error, State v. Favreau, 134 N.H. 336, 342, 592 A.2d 1136, 1140 (1991).

For example, we require proof of a waiver to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Derby, 131 N.H. 760, 761, 561 A.2d 504, 504 (1989); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978), and we have established special rules for evaluating waivers by juveniles, State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 17-19, 490 A.2d 295, 302-04 (1985).

On appeal, she challenges the State’s use of her confession during her trial on the ground that, although she was only seventeen years of age at the time she admitted her role in the crime, she was given the standard Miranda warnings, rather than the juvenile warnings under State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 490 A.2d 295 (1985).

The Merrimack County House of Correction does not contain segregated quarters for juveniles, see RSA 169-B:15, and is not equipped to offer rehabilitative services to juveniles who may be incarcerated there.

In order to establish a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel, “[i]t must be shown that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 14, 490 A.2d 295, 301 (1985) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).