Cited by

Thomas v. Town of Hooksett, 153 N.H. 717, 721 (2006); City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 468 (1984); see also Bosonetto, 163 N.H. at 742-43.

“The party asserting estoppel bears the burden of proof.” City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 467 (1984).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 468 (1984).

Town of Windham v. Alfond, 129 N.H. 24, 32 (1986); City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 470 (1984); cf. Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 499-500 (2007) (mere showing of historical laxity in enforcement is not sufficient to establish conscious, intentional discrimination necessary to bar enforcement of ordinance); see also Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 89-90 (2008) (“agency none

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 468 (1984) (holding that reliance upon representation must be reasonable and that reliance is unreasonable when party knew or should have known that the conduct was either improper, materially incorrect, or misleading).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 467 (1984).

“Each element of estoppel requires a factual determination.” City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 468 (1984).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 468 (1984).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 467-68, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1984).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 462, 467-68, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1984) (citations omitted).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 469, 471 A.2d 1152, 1155 (1984).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 472-73, 471 A.2d 1152, 1157-58 (1984) (noting that other jurisdictions employ an equity balancing test to decide whether to estop the government, yet holding that the facts presented did not necessitate such an analysis).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 468, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1984).

terial facts made with knowledge of those facts; second, the party to whom the representation was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; third, the representation must have been made with the intention of inducing the other party to rely upon it; and fourth, the other party must have been induced to rely upon the representation to his or her injury.” City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 467-68, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1984).

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 467-68, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1984); 28 Am.

In City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 471 A.2d 1152 (1984), we stated that “a municipality’s failure to enforce an ordinance does not constitute ratification of a policy of nonenforcement and, consequently, will not estop a municipality’s subsequent enforcement of the ordinance.” Id.

The defendants are in no position to make even a colorable claim to municipal estoppel, see City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 467-69, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1984), or to argue that the town delayed in communicating its position and thereby rendered injunctive relief inequitable.

Although this court has recognized the use of estoppel against a municipal corporation under certain conditions, private parties when dealing with government officials are charged with “notice of the extent and limits of their authority” and must “inquire into the power of the corporation or its officers.” City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 470, 471 A.2d 1152, 1156 (1984).

terial facts made with knowledge of those facts; second, the party to whom the representation was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; third, the representation must have been made with the intention of inducing the other party to rely upon it; and fourth, the other party must have been induced to rely upon the representation to his or her injury.” City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 467-68, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1984).

Although this Court has recognized the principle of governmental estoppel, City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 471 A.2d 1152 (1984), the operation of this principle depends upon proof of each of the four elements of estoppel: (1) there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts made with knowledge of those facts; (2) the party to whom the representation was made must have been ignorant of the truth of t

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 471 A.2d 1152 (1984).

th the rule that anyone dealing with an agent of a municipal corporation is “bound to ascertain the nature and extent of his authority,” Smith v. Epping, 69 N.H. 558, 560, 45 A. 415, 416 (1899), and that consequently a plaintiff “who relied upon the government official’s unauthorized conduct or *392 statements cannot be deemed to have been injured by the government.” City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 471, 471 A.2d 1152, 1156 (1984); see generally 1A C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law

City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 468, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1984); see also Brooks v. New Durham, 55 N.H. 559, 560-61 (1875); Burbank v. Rockingham M.F.I.