Cited by

In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 380-81 (1983) (declining to treat deadline for issuing order on petition to terminate parental rights as jurisdictional because doing so would defeat statutory objectives by penalizing the child’s interest).1 Here, RSA chapter 169-C, also called the Child Protection Act (Act), states that “[i]t is the primary

In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 381 (1983) (discussing termination of parental rights proceedings); see also Smith, 138 N.H. at 551.

See, e.g., Smith, 138 N.H. at 551; In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 381 (1983).

In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 381 (1983) (discussing that the purpose of the sixty-day time limit for issuing a decision in termination of parental rights cases is “to provide a speedy disposition for the sake of the child’s welfare and the interest of the parent whose parental rights may be terminated”).

See, e.g., State v. Gallagher, 157 N.H. 421, 425 (2008); cf. In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 381 (1983) (declining to treat as jurisdictional the court’s failure to observe sixty-day period for the disposition of parental rights termination petition).

The State argues that, rather than following our holdings in McCarthy and Russell C., we must consider RSA chapter 135-E in light of our holdings in Smith v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548 (1994), In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377 (1983), and Appeal of Martino, 138 N.H. 612 (1994).

We must first determine whether RSA 135-C:39, II’s instruction that the court act within thirty days is mandatory or directory.

at 59 (quotation omitted); see also In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 379 (1983) (“shall” denotes a mandatory statutory prescription).

The superior court must conduct a de novo hearing on “the matter.” Id.; cf. In re Robyn W, 124 N.H. 377, 379, 469 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1983) (“shall” denotes a mandatory statutory prescription).

In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 379, 469 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1983); In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980).

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 268, 414 A.2d 934, 938 (1980); see In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 380-81, 469 A.2d 1351, 1353 (1983).

In support of her argument, she cites RSA 170-C:11, Y (1990), which states: “The court shall issue a decision which shall include a disposition not later than 60 days after the date of the final hearing.” In In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 469 A.2d 1351 (1983), we construed RSA 170-C:11, V as requiring that the probate court render its decision on a petition for termination of parental rights within sixty days of the final hearing.

The word “shall” is “a command, which requires mandatory enforcement.” In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 379, 469 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1983); see also Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 128 N.H. 325, 331, 514 A.2d 1257, 1260 (1986).

In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 379, 469 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1983); New Hampshire-Vermont Health Service v. Commissioner of Insurance, 122 N.H. 268, 272, 444 A.2d 508, 510 (1982).

RSA 21:2; In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 379, 469 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1983).

To the extent that it raises a new issue of statutory interpretation, we begin our inquiry with the examination of statutory language.

In determining legislative intent, we begin with an examination of the statutory language.

In determining legislative intent, inquiry begins with an examination of the statutory language.

RSA 21:2; In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 379, 469 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1983).

The inquiry must begin with the statutory language itself.

Assuming that the quoted language may rightly be classified as mandatory rather than directory, see In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 379, 469 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1983), it does not necessarily follow that the language creates a jurisdictional limitation in any of the senses that the defendant claims.

There is no indication in the legislative record of the precise meaning of “all reasonable costs of collection.” We shall, therefore, in an attempt to interpret the statute, give its words their plain and ordinary meaning.

In our interpretation of a statute, we first review the plain meaning of its language.

To construe the meaning of RSA 630:3, we must determine the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute by reference to the language of the statute itself.

To construe the meaning of RSA 169-C:31 (Supp. 1983), we must determine the intent of the legislature, in enacting the statutory scheme, by reference to the language of the statutory sections themselves.

In In re Robyn W., we held that “the language and legislative intent of RSA 170-C:11, V (Supp. 1983) mandate that a court issue a decision within sixty days after the final hearing” unless the delay is trifling.