Cited by

State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 746 (1984); N.H. CONST, pt.

State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747 (1984) (holding mental illness does not render a confession involuntary as a matter of law).

The focus of our voluntariness inquiry is “whether the actions of an individual are the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted); State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747 (1984).

No single definition of voluntariness exists that can be mechanically applied.

State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747, 474 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1984) (citation and quotation omitted).

[or] are the product of a will overborne by police tactics, or of a mind incapable of a conscious choice.” State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747, 474 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1984) (quotations and citations omitted).

The defendant has not offered any evidence *660 of irregularity that occurred during the general instructions to the grand jury nor has he “shown a reason to pierce the secrecy of the grand jury.” State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 749, 474 A.2d 1045, 1049 (1984); see United States v. Warren, 16 F.3d 247, 253 (8th Cir. 1994) (bare allegation that grand jury records are necessary to determine if there was a defect in the process is not adequate).

State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747, 474 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1984) (quotation omitted).

In the area of confessions, “the determination of voluntariness [is] made in light of the totality of all the surrounding circumstances,” State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747, 474 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1984) (quotation omitted); “an inquiry into a confessor’s mental condition can never be dispositive in applying the constitutional concept of voluntariness,” State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 400, 605 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1992) (quotation omitted).

In reaching its finding, the trial court was obligated to consider the totality of the surrounding circumstances.

*144 We first consider these claims under the State Constitution, State v. Berthiaume, 124 N.H. 264, 266, 470 A.2d 893, 894 (1983), looking to federal law not as binding precedent but only for guidance, State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 746, 474 A.2d 1045, 1047 (1984).

Nonetheless, “this court has long recognized the traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 748, 474 A.2d 1045, 1049 (1984).

Voluntariness is determined based on the “‘totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’” State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747, 474 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1984) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).

In assessing voluntariness, the court should examine the “‘totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’” State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747, 474 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1984) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).

Once, however, the respondent narrowed his focus to the result he seeks in this case, he rested his pleadings in the probate court exclusively on criminal cases, all of them applying federal standards, save for State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 746-47, 474 A.2d 1045, 1047-48 (1984), upon which he also relied in his brief.

Similarly, the State Constitution guarantees every citizen due process of the law.

A determination as to the voluntariness of a statement must “be made in light of the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. *742 742, 747, 474 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1984) (quoting Schneckloth, supra at 226).