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Rather, “[assuming the article’s concern extends beyond the improper application of capital punishment, it forbids only gross disproportionality between offense and penalty.” State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 15 (1984) (citation omitted).

State v. Plch, 149 N.H. 608, 616 (2003); State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 9 (1984).

State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 13 (1984) (finding defendant’s statement shortly after the crime that he “didn’t want to go to prison anymore, and that if the police would stop him he would kill himself’ relevant as an admission of guilt despite the fact that it could have more than one interpretation).

“While the object of the requirement is to rule out action on sudden impulse, no particular period of premeditation and deliberation is required.” State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 12 (1984).

“[0]nce a defendant has invoked his right to counsel by declining to speak to the police without a lawyer present, the police must refrain from or stop interrogation, and scrupulously honor the defendant’s right to stop it.” State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 9 (1984) (citation omitted) (conducting analysis under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution).

Under Edwards, “if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984); see also State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 10 (1984).

State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 11 (1984) (waiver not involuntary because, in part, the record reflected that the mention of leniency came after the waiver, not before it).

The elements of premeditation and deliberation require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of *661 “some reflection and consideration upon the choice to kill or not to kill, and the formation of a definite purpose to kill.” State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 11-12 (1984) (quotation and ellipses omitted).

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (accused who invokes right to counsel can be re-interrogated when he initiates further communication'with police); State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 9, 480 A.2d 854, 859 (1984) (defendant may waive right to counsel after invocation if defendant initiates conversation); Beaupre, 123 N.H. at 158, 459 A.2d at 235 (valid waiver where accused initiates communication without prompting by police).

533, 541-42, 87 A. 61, 64 (1913); see State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 16, 480 A.2d 854, 863 (1984) (the specification of minimum and maximum terms is required to determine parole eligibility and duration).

When asked to overturn a conviction because of insufficient evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 12, 480 A.2d 854, 860 (1984), and uphold the jury’s verdict unless no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 12, 480 A.2d 854, 860 (1984), and the jury’s verdict upheld unless no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, a mistrial is warranted, absent prosecutorial violation of a prior court ruling excluding certain evidence, only when that evidence is “inadmissible and both preponderantly and irremediably prejudicial.” State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 13, 480 A.2d 854, 861 (1984).

The State does not contest the proposition that the defendant was thereafter entitled to the assistance of counsel during any interrogation, in the admitted absence of any waiver of that right, see State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 9, 480 A.2d 854, 858 (1984).

To sustain this challenge, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion, State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985), that no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the evidence most favorably to the State, State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 12, 480 A.2d 854, *773 860 (1984), that the defendant engaged in “some reflection and consideration upon the.

State v. Avery, 126 N.H. 208, 212, 490 A.2d 1350, 1353 (1985); see also State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 13, 480 A.2d 854, 861 (1984).

State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 480 A.2d 854 (1984) (indictment for attempted first degree murder; conviction for attempted second).

Nor can such a practice be seen as producing the “gross disproportionality” between penalty and offense that part I, article 18 of our own constitution forbids.

State v. Elbert, 121 N.H. 43, 424 A.2d 1147 (1981) (jury selection challenge); State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 480 A.2d 854 (1984) (appeal from conviction).

“While the object of the requirement [of premeditation and deliberation] is to rule out action on sudden impulse, no particular period of premeditation and deliberation is required.” State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 12, 480 A.2d 854, 860 (1984).

We believe that the language of article 18 is best read as a general statement of principle rather than as a mandatory standard which creates affirmative rights.

In doing so, we consider all of the evidence.

This finding was not clearly erroneous; nor can we say that the information conveyed to the jury “was inadmissible and both preponderantly and irremediably prejudicial.” State v. Elbert, 125 N.H. 1, 13, 480 A.2d 854, 861 (1984).

We will therefore consider it here, while reminding counsel of the need for a record of issues raised.