Cited by

State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 105-06 (1983); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).

We will disturb the trial court’s finding only if it is not supported by the record.

Analyzing the case under our settled constitutional principles, we first inquire whether Trooper Wiggin’s activities constituted a search within the meaning of part I, article 19.

In State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101,106-07, 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983), we held that a warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle violated his rights under part I, article 19, and stated, “Since the fruits of that search provided the primary basis for the objects that were the subject of the defendant’s motion to suppress, that motion should have been

State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 106, 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983) (consent to search invalid where officers not on premises to which authority to search extended).

Given the defendant’s response, it appears that there was ample evidence from which the court could conclude that ‘“the consent given [to go to the motel room] was free, knowing and voluntary.’” State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 105, 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983) (quoting State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 498 (1979)).

However, in considering what constitutes a search for purposes of our Constitution, we have stated that ‘“[a] search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law, a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.’” State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 104, 467 A.2d 571, 573 (1983) (quoting State v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 191, 208 A.2d 322, 326 (1965), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.

“Whether the defendant consented to the police entry into his room is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.

Whether the defendant consented to the police entry into his room is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.

We have held that the inspection of hidden VIN’s on automobiles constitutes a search for purposes of our State Constitution.

State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 105, 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983); State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 498 (1979); State v. Laro, 106 N.H. 500, 503, 213 A.2d 909, 911 (1965); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973).

State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 106-07, 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983); State v. Hanson, 113 N.H. 689, 313 A.2d 730 (1973).

.” In State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 104, 467 A.2d 571, 573 (1983), this court held that, under our State Constitution, the official inspection of a vehicle identification number which is not in plain view and which is located within a vehicle constitutes a search.