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[¶17] We have previously stated that the credibility of evidence “is not a ‘defense’ to a criminal charge, as that term is employed” in RSA 626:6.

(quotation omitted); State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 97 (1983).

A witness’s credibility, however, is not a “defense” to a criminal charge for purposes of requiring an instruction under Demeritt.

This theory presented an entirely different factual scenario for the jury to evaluate and turned the trial into a credibility contest between the defendant and the victim, which is not a legal defense to any charge.

.” State v. Bruneau, 131 N.H. 104, 117, 552 A.2d 585, 594 (1988) (quoting State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 97, 467 A.2d 233, 235 (1983)).

“A requested charge on a party’s theory of defense must be given if such theory is supported by some evidence,” State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 97, 467 A.2d 233, 235 (1983) (quoting State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 635, 421 A.2d 124, 125 (1980)), but reversal of a jury verdict is unwarranted when a jury charge “fairly covers the issues and law of a case,” State v. Bird, 122 N.H. 10, 15, 440 A.2d 441, 443 (1982).

ample time to review [them and] to decide whether they should be included in the charge.” State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 98, 99, 467 A.2d 233, 237 (1983); see State v. Lister, 122 N.H. 603, 607, 448 A.2d 395, 398 (1982) (defendant waived right to specific jury instruction where request for specific instruction was untimely, defendant having waited until after court had charged jury).

While it is, of course, true that a trial judge is bound to instruct the jury on a defendant’s “theory of defense,” if there is an evidentiary basis to support it, State v. Aubert supra, our law distinguishes a “theory of defense” from what is called a “theory of the case,” State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 97, 467 A.2d 233, 235-36 (1983).

State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 100, 467 A.2d 233, 237 (1983); State v. St.

The requested instruction was merely an attempt to have the court, in effect, comment on the defendant’s theory of the case, i.e., that this late prosecution was fabricated by the complain *742 ant and her mother and was motivated by the divorce proceedings.

As we have stated before, “ ‘[w]e will not second-guess the tactical decisions of defense counsel.’” State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. *429 93, 98, 467 A.2d 233, 236 (1983) (quoting State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 946, 454 A.2d 422, 425 (1982)).

“The constitutional standard by which we measure the performance of an attorney representing [a] client in a criminal case is ‘reasonable competence.’ ” State v. Labonville, 126 N.H. 451, 454, 492 A.2d 1376, 1378 (1985); State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 98, 467 A.2d 233, 236 (1983).

Thereafter, the defendant unsuccessfully appealed both convictions on the grounds of inadequate jury instructions and denial of effective assistance of counsel.

“The constitutional standard by which we measure the performance of a lawyer representing his client in a criminal case is ‘reasonable competence.’” State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 98, 467 A.2d 233, 236 (1983) (quoting State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 946, 454 A.2d 422, 424 (1982)).

In the petition now before us, the plaintiff alleges that counsel failed to provide him with effective assistance at his murder trial, see State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 98, 467 A.2d 233, 236 *705 (1983); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-69 (1984), and that this, combined with alleged prosecutorial misconduct, resulted in a trial lacking in fundamental due process.

The defendant is not admitting liability and pointing to facts that exonerate, excuse or justify his conduct, but is denying criminal behavior by advancing his theory of the case.

Viewing the record as a whole, we hold that the defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at his trial.