Cited by

State v. Zwicker, 151 N.H. 179, 186 (2004); see also State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92 (1983).

The trial court is in a better position than we to assess the credibility of witnesses.

State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 93, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.

Although we have said that a confession is involuntary if “‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, or obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence,’“ see State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)) (brackets omitted), voluntariness is more properly determined by considering the totality of the circumstances.

Under the State Constitution, the question we must ask is whether the confession was the ‘“product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice’ and was not ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. McDermott supra (quoting State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983)).

State v. Lewis, 129 N.H. 787, 791, 533 A.2d 358, 361 (1987); State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983).

A statement is voluntary for purposes of the State Constitution if it was the “‘product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice’ and was not ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’” Id.

A determination of the voluntariness of a confession is a question of fact for the trial court to decide, State v. Wood, 128 N.H. 739, 742, 519 A.2d 277, 279 (1986), and we will not overturn that decision unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983).

“[A] finding on this question [voluntariness] ‘by the trial judge who stands in the best position to weigh credibility of witnesses will not be overturned unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.’” State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1984) (quoting State v. Geldart, 111 N.H. 219, 221, 279 A.2d 588, 590 (1971)).

We are mindful that a finding made by the trial court after examining the totality of evidence is entitled to stand unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983), viewed in the light most favorable to the State.

To prove that a statement is voluntary, the State must show that the statement was “‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice,’ and was not ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983) (quoting Sehneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973), and Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)).

To determine whether the use of the defendant’s incriminating statements elicited by Officer Cook offends due process, our inquiry will focus on whether the defendant’s statements were “ ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra at 225 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)); see also State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983) (burden of State to prove that confession made during custodial interrogation w

However, the nucleus of the inquiry is whether the actions of an individual are “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” State v. Copeland, 124 N.H. 90, 92, 467 A.2d 238, 240 (1983) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra at 225).

tariness, the State must show that a confession was ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice,’ Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973), and was not ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any *434 improper influence.’ Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)..."