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The burden is on the State to prove an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of the right to counsel, which depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case, including the defendant’s background, experience, and conduct.

Furthermore, we rely upon federal decisions only to aid our analysis.

be improper unless [he] had waived his right to counsel.” State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368-69 (1983).

In order for a waiver of the right to counsel to be considered voluntary, the defendant must know of his right to have his counsel present, understand the consequences of waiving that right, and choose to waive the right without any inducement by the government.

Because we believe the principles are the same in any event, we address her argument under both constitutions, by reference to federal decisions.

Having properly preserved both his State and federal constitutional claims, see State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545, 567 A.2d 557, 560 (1989), we first consider the defendant’s State claim, looking to federal law not as binding precedent but only for guidance.

We find no violation of State law and do not separately discuss the federal claim, as the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides no greater protection in this case than does part I, article 19 of the State Constitution.

State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983); State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983).

State v. Bruneau, 131 N.H. 104, 108, 552 A.2d 585, 587-88 (1988); State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368-69, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983).

The State concedes that the defendant’s right to counsel had attached as of September, 1986, see State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983); State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 28-29, 458 A.2d 95, 101-02 (1983), appeal after remand, 125 N.H. 810, 486 A.2d 297 (1984).

There is no dispute that the defendant’s article 15 right to the assistance of counsel had attached by virtue of the commencement of formal criminal proceedings, c/.

“[W]e need only address federal issues insofar as federal law would provide greater protection, or if the United States Constitution would be offended by our decision.” State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983).

State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983); see also State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33, 471 A.2d 347, 350-52 (1983).

The possibility of such a rule in this State is foreclosed by our holding in State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 470 A.2d 909 (1983), that a valid waiver of the right to the presence of counsel does not require the presence of counsel.

The due process clause of the State Constitution requires that the determination of voluntariness be made in light of “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra at 226; cf. State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 370, 470 A.2d 909, 914 (1983) (determination of waiver of State constitutional right to counsel depends on all the particular facts and circumstances in each case).

We will overturn the trial court’s finding only if, after reviewing the record, we conclude that *435 it is contrary to the weight of the evidence.

State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983); State v. Clough, 115 N.H. 7, 10, 332 A.2d 386, 388-89 (1975).