Cited by

We address the defendant’s State constitutional claim first, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), citing federal law only to aid our analysis.

Consistent with State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), we first consider the due process requirements of part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and refer to cases under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution only to aid our analysis.

Similarly, we analyze the petitioners’ improper delegation argument under the protections afforded by part I, article 37.

We address the defendant’s State constitutional claim first, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), citing federal law only to aid our analysis.

State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1983); see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).

Although we are not bound by these cases, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 233, 471 A.2d 347, 351-52 (1983), we may nevertheless rely on federal precedent for guidance in construing similar provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution or statutes.

Accordingly, while we make an independent determination of Pitts’ claim under the State Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), the analysis and result is the same under each constitution.

We will consider the State claim first.

We address the defendant’s State constitutional claim first, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), citing federal law only to aid our analysis.

We address Dr. Grimm’s State constitutional claim first, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), citing federal law only if it aids our analysis.

When a defendant invokes both the State and Federal Constitutions, we will consider the State claim before addressing the federal claim, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), but we may nevertheless rely on federal precedent for guidance in construing similar provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution.

“Since October 4, 1990, have you given any money or property or anything of value to your husband?” We address the Latshaws’ State constitutional claim first.

We address the defendant’s State constitutional claim first, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), citing federal law only to aid our analysis.

We independently consider the defendant’s claims first under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), citing to federal law only as an aid in our analysis, State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 594, 493 A.2d 1139, 1143 (1985).

We rely on the State Constitution in our analysis and will reach the federal claim only if the Federal Constitution affords greater protection.

We will first address the defendant’s claim under the New Hampshire Constitution.

We independently consider the defendant’s claims first under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), citing to federal law only as an aid in our analysis, State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 594, 493 A.2d 1139, 1143 (1985).

In accord with State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), we first address the defendant’s State constitutional claim.

Because the Federal Constitution offers no greater protection than our State Constitution under its equal protection provi *222 sions, see Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980), we rely on our State Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983), and use federal case law “only as an aid to our analysis.” State v. Gravel, 135 N.H. 172, 176, 601 A.2d 678, 680 (1991).

Because Guajardo was decided under the sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution, we must now decide whether the State Constitution provides additional protection to the defendant.

Because the standard for attorney performance is the same under the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions, see State v. Matiyosus, 134 N.H. 686, 687, 597 A.2d 1068, 1069 (1991), we consider the defendant’s claim under the State Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), using federal law only as an aid in our analysis, see State v. Faragi, 127 N.H. 1, 4, 498 A.2d 723, 726 (1985).

We will address the defendant’s State claims first and turn to federal claims only if federal law provides additional protections.

As a preliminary matter, we analyze his argument under the protections afforded by part I, article 15.

In accord with State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), we first address the State constitutional claims and *111 refer to federal case law only to aid our analysis.

His argument, and our decision, is grounded in part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which states in part that “[e]very subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches.” We base our decision upon our own case law, using federal cases only for guidance.

We will consider the defendant’s contentions first under the New Hampshire Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), citing decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States for their guidance in analyzing and deciding the State issues.

Consistent with State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983), we analyze the constitutional claims advanced by the defendant by considering first whether admitting the hearsay statements in this case violated the defendant’s right of confrontation under part I, article 15 of the State Constitution.

We examine the defendant’s due process claim first under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

We first assess the defendant’s due proc *685 ess claim under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

Because we find that the seizure was illegal under our State Constitution, we need not reach the fourth amendment issue.

Consistent with our holding in State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), we first consider the defendant’s claims under part I, article 15 of the State Constitution, using federal case law only as an aid to our analysis.

Although the Keene Sentinel bases its claim on both Federal and State constitutional grounds, our decision today rests solely on our interpretation of the New Hampshire Constitution.

State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983); State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 264, 385 A.2d 844, 845 (1978).

Because the Federal Constitution does not provide the defendant with greater protection in this area than she is entitled to under part I, article 15, we decide this case exclusively under the State Constitution.

Because the New Hampshire Constitution affords greater protection for individual rights than does the Federal Constitution in this area, we limit our analysis to the State claim.

Because the defendant has preserved his State constitutional claim on appeal, we will decide on that basis, looking to federal cases for guidance.

As a preliminary matter, we will analyze these arguments under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-32, 471 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1983); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan invites state courts to “impose higher standards” under state law).

In accordance with our holding in State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), we first consider the defendant’s claims under our State Constitution, and look to federal case law only to aid in our analysis, State v. Gravel, 135 N.H. 172, 176, 601 A.2d 678, 680 (1991); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).

Therefore, we will address the defendant’s claim under the State Constitution first and look to the decisions of the federal courts only for guidance.

We begin by first evaluating the defendant’s State constitutional claims, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), using decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions only as aids in our analysis, State v. Cimino, 126 N.H. 570, 572-73, 493 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1985) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-41 (1983)).

Consistent with our holding in State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), we first consider the defendant’s claims under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, “us[ing] federal case law only as an aid to our analysis.

Because the defendant rests his claim on both constitutions, we address it independently under the State Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), although, as the two standards are identical, “the analysis and result is the same under each constitution,” State v. Glidden, 127 N.H. 359, 361, 499 A.2d 1349, 1350 (1985).

Likewise, in State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), we held that mere observation of a hand-rolled cigarette did not establish probable cause unless there were additional corroborating facts, such as “that the defendant made a furtive gesture in an attempt to conceal the cigarette----” Ball, supra at 236, 471 A.2d at 353.

Because the State constitutional standard adopted in Carroll, and applied here today, affords the same protection as that provided by the Federal Constitution, we need not examine the fourth amendment issue.

As a preliminary matter, we will analyze the respondent’s argument under the protections afforded by part I, articles 2,12 and 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

As a preliminary matter, we will analyze the defendant’s argument under the protections afforded by part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

The State claims that the seizure was proper under the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement.

We first look to the protection afforded under the New Hampshire Constitution, and only look to the Federal Constitution to the extent that it affords greater protection.

We have held that the New Hampshire Constitution may provide our citizens with more protection relative to search and seizure than the Federal Constitution.