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However, we review the trial court’s factual findings deferentially, our task not being to determine “whether we would have found differently but to determine whether a reasonable person could find as did the trial judge.” U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153 (1983).

Co., 135 N.H. 719, 722 (1992) (in looking beyond writ in determining insurer’s duty to defend, the court noted that plaintiff filed an affidavit in support of its argument); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 152 (1983) (affirming trial court’s decision that insurer had duty to defend where trial court looked “beyond the facts as alleged in the underlying writs”).

U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 152 (1983).

Our adoption of the “injury-in-fact” trigger for the policies at issue is consistent with our holdings in U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148 (1983), and Peerless Insurance Co. v. Clough, 105 N.H. 76 (1963).

U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85, 88 (1983).

“The burden of establishing noncoverage is upon the insurer,” U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85, 87 (1983); see RSA 491:22-a (1983), including the burden of proof as to damages, see Coakley, 136 N.H. at 409, 618 A.2d at 781.

“It is well-settled law in New Hampshire that an insurer’s obligation to defend its insured is determined by whether the cause *442 of action against the insured alleges sufficient facts in the pleadings to bring it within the express terms of the policy, even though the suit may eventually be found to be without merit.” U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 151-52, 461 A.2d 85, 87 (1983).

The duty of an insurer to defend is not necessarily coextensive with its duty to pay.” U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 151-52, 461 A.2d 85, 87 (1983) (citation omitted).

U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 151-52, 461 A.2d 85, 87 (1983); 7C J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4683 (W. Berdal ed., 1979 & Supp. 1991).

For example, the cost of cleaning up the contaminated groundwater is undoubtedly “remedial rather than preventive,” Desrochers, 99 N.H. at 131, 106 A.2d at 198, as is reimbursement of that portion of the EPA’s investigatory costs necessary to a cleanup, cf. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 461 A.2d 85 (1983) (finding coverage for party sued for reimbursement of cleanup costs).

“It is well-settled law in New Hampshire that an insurer’s obligation to defend its insured is determined by whether the cause of action against the insured alleges sufficient facts in the pleadings to bring it within the express terms of the policy, even though the suit may eventually be found to be without merit.” U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 151-52, 461 A.2d 85, 87 (1983).

Co. v. Custombilt, Inc., supra at 170, 512 A.2d at 1100 (quoting U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85, 88 (1983)).

This interpretation is adequately supported by the plain language of the exception and is further bolstered by the policy’s general provision that the act of “an insured person will be binding upon another.” Thus, assuming Bobby’s acts as alleged in the Migdals’ writ were “intentional” within the meaning of the coverage exception, see U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 151-52, 461 A.2d 85, 87 (1983), his parents, as well as he, were excepted from coverag

Because “[i]t is well-settled law in New Hampshire that an insurer’s obligation to defend its insured is determined by whether the cause of action against the insured alleges sufficient facts in the pleadings to bring it within the express terms of the policy,” U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 151-52, 461 A.2d 85, 87 (1983), and because the parties agree that there was no bodily injury in this case, the relevant inquiry in this case is limited to wheth

U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85, 88 (1983).

“Our function in reviewing the trial court’s findings is not to decide whether we would have found differently but to determine whether a reasonable person could find as did the trial judge.” U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85, 88 (1983).

In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 461 A.2d 85 *730 (1983), we indicated that “to the extent any issue was litigated and determined in the declaratory-judgment action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the parties to the first action, or their privies, from relitigating the question in the underlying suits.” Id.

U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85, 88 (1983).

U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85, 88 (1983).

Co., 124 N.H. 148, 467 A.2d 254 (1983); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85, 88 (1983).