Cited by

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (explaining that “[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 433 (1984) (“By voluntarily initiating the discussion...

Dellorfano, 128 N.H. at 632; see State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 432 (1984) (although defendant’s brief referred extensively to state case law, the defendant did not cite a New Hampshire constitutional provision and thus did not raise a state constitutional issue).

Rather, all the facts must be examined and their nuances assessed to determine whether, in making the promise, the police exerted such an influence on the defendant that his will was overborne.” State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 434 (1984) (citation omitted).

The existence of a promise is not dispositive of the question of voluntariness.

State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 434, 471 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1984) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

In light of the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing to find that by agreeing to inform authorities of the defendant’s willingness to bargain, “the police exerted such an influence on the defendant that his will was overborne.” State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 434, 471 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1984).

A statement by a police officer that a defendant’s cooperation will be taken into account is not dispositive of the voluntariness of a confession.

A statement is voluntary only if it is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice and thus must be considered involuntary where the defendant’s will has been overborne by improper police tactics.

at 478; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1981) (interrogation must cease when defendant invokes right to counsel, but subsequent volunteered statements by defendant admissible); State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 433, 471 A.2d 1172, 1174-75 (1984).

Promises to inform other authorities of the defendant’s cooperation, see United States v. Glasgow, 451 F.2d 557, 558 (9th Cir. 1971), or to recommend reduced bail in exchange for incriminating evidence, see State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 429-30, 471 A.2d 1172, 1173 (1984), which promises are not dispositive of the issue of voluntariness but add to the State’s burden of proof, id., are categorically different from a promise of confidentiality or of immunity from prosecution in exchange for a st

“We will not overturn the trial court’s finding unless, after reviewing the record, we conclude that it is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Winders, supra at 475, 503 A.2d at 800 (citing State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 434-35, 471 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1984)); see State v. Duff, 129 N.H. 731, 736, 532 A.2d 1381, 1384 (1987).

ained by trickery or deception, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1147-48 (1986); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1983), other cases have found a violation of the fundamental fairness standard in admitting any involuntary confession, even though trickery was no inducement for the defendant to speak, see Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1960); see also State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 432, 471 A.2d 1172, 1174 (1984).

Mindful that we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling on appeal unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, Wood, supra at 742, 519 A.2d at 279; State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 434-35, 471 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1984), we hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, the State has failed to sustain its burden of proving that this defendant waived his rights.

State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 432, 471 A.2d 1172, 1174 (1984).

State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 432, 471 A.2d 1172, 1173-74 (1984); see also State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632-33, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986).

te v. Westover, 127 N.H. 130, 497 A.2d 1218 (1985) (defendant’s brief referred in terms to the State Constitution, but since the defendant failed to rely on the applicable State constitutional provision in his pre-trial motion to suppress, the issue had not been preserved for appeal); second, the defendant’s brief must specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution, State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 432, 471 A.2d 1172, 1173-74 (1984) (although defendant’s brief referred extensively to

Since the defendant relies solely on the Federal Constitution, we need not address the State Constitution.

State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 434-35, 471 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1984) (citation omitted).

We accordingly treat any State claim as waived and proceed to consider the application of federal standards only.

We will not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are contrary to the weight of the evidence or constitute an error of law.

Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973); State v. Reynolds, 124 N.H. 428, 432, 471 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1984).

The previous discussion of the record indicates that the trial judge had a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that the statements were voluntary.

On our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding was contrary to the weight of the evidence and, accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.