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Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 453 A.2d 1295.

21 citing documents.

  • In re Justin D. 743 A.2d 829 N.H. 1999
    Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Belluscio v. Town of Westmoreland 648 A.2d 211 N.H. 1994
    “[T]he words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Doggett v. Town of North Hampton Zoning Board of Adjustment 645 A.2d 673 N.H. 1994
    Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbar- *746 ton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • State v. Dushame 616 A.2d 469 N.H. 1992
    We have consistently held that "the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature's intention," Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982), and that "legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have intended, but rather, in the meaning of what it did say."
  • Chroniak v. Golden Investment Corp. 577 A.2d 1209 N.H. 1990
    “It is well established that the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Chambers v. Geiger 573 A.2d 1356 N.H. 1990
    “It is well established that the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Hodge v. Allstate Insurance 546 A.2d 1078 N.H. 1988
    olicy pursuant to RSA 491:22, if the insured prevails in such action, he shall receive court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees from the insurer.” In interpreting this statute, “‘[i]t is well established that the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.’” Appeal of Locke, 127 N.H. 403, 405, 503 A.2d 754, 755 (1985) (quoting Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982)).
  • In re Jessica J. 546 A.2d 1056 N.H. 1988
    Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Appeal of Westwick 546 A.2d 1051 N.H. 1988
    v. State, 127 N.H. 565, 568, 503 A.2d 829, 831 (1986) (quoting Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982)).
  • Psychiatric Institute of America v. Mediplex, Inc. 536 A.2d 169 N.H. 1987
    Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Appeal of Coastal Materials Corp. 534 A.2d 398 N.H. 1987
    Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Feuerstein v. Gilmore 506 A.2d 327 N.H. 1986
    The statutory language is “the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982) (citations omitted).
  • State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State 503 A.2d 829 N.H. 1986
    Both the issue of damages and the issue of current eligibility for full benefits turn on the words of RSA chapter 98-A, which “are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982) (citations omitted).
  • Appeal of Locke 503 A.2d 754 N.H. 1985
    “It is well established that the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • In re Richard M. 497 A.2d 1200 N.H. 1985
    “It is well established that the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Public Service Co. v. Town of Seabrook 496 A.2d 352 N.H. 1985
    “When construing an ambiguous statute, this court looks to both the legislative intent and the objectives of the legislation.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • State v. Maloney 490 A.2d 772 N.H. 1985
    Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Service, Inc. 484 A.2d 1101 N.H. 1984
    “It is well established that the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Appeal of Public Service Co. 480 A.2d 20 N.H. 1984
    If the statute is unambiguous when so viewed, there is no justification for judicial modification, State v. Flynn supra, and we will look to legislative history as a guide to meaning only if ambiguity requires choice, Greenhalge v. Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982).
  • Northern States Power Co. v. Williams 343 N.W.2d 627 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Flynn 464 A.2d 268 N.H. 1983
    “It is well established that the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature’s intention.” Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982) (citations omitted).