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RSA 629:3, I. Conspiracy punishes the agreement to commit or cause the commission of a crime.

This contention is consistent with the principle that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches “at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against a defendant.” State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 28 (1983).

State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 24 (1983) (conspiracy to receive stolen property is a separate and distinct crime from the crime of receiving stolen property).

Conspiracy punishes the agreement to commit or cause the commission of a crime.

We have held that adversary judicial proceedings are commenced by the filing of a complaint in court, and not merely by the signing of the complaint.

State v. Chiasson, 123 N.H. 17, 24, 458 A.2d 95, 99 (1983)(holding that indictment charging the defendant with burglary that alleged entry with purpose to commit “theft,” a term which has several statutory definitions, was sufficient).

1972) (quotation omitted); see Allen, 128 N.H. at 392-96, 514 A.2d at 1265-68; see also 2 C. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 261, at 121 (13th ed. 1990); State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 24, 458 A.2d 95, 99 (1983).

See, e.g., State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 29, 458 A.2d 95, 102 (1983); Winslow v. Dietlin, 100 N.H. 147, 149, 121 A.2d 573, 575 (1956); Panagoulis v. Company, 95 N.H. 524, 525, 68 A.2d 672, 673 (1949).

The trial court has discretion in determining whether to allow cross-examination about prior criminal convictions, see State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 30, 458 A.2d 95, 102 (1983), and we will not overturn the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion.

The party offering evidence bears the burden to make an offer of proof to show the relevance of the evidence offered.

For a trial judge to completely bar cross-examination in a proper area of inquiry violates the right of confrontation.

This right is guaranteed to defendants in State, as well as in federal, proceedings.

Regan v. Perini Power Constructors, Inc., 126 N.H. 171, 173, 489 A.2d 137, 138 (1985); State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 27-28, 458 A.2d 95, 101, (1983).

State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 27-28, 458 A.2d 95, 101 (1983); Taylor v. Gagne, 121 N.H. 948, 949, 437 A.2d 262, 263 (1981).

It is well established that “[t]he sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 30, 458 A.2d 95, 103 (1983).

State v. Goding, 124 N.H. 781, 784, 474 A.2d 580, 581 (1984); State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 30, 458 A.2d 95, 102 (1983).

generally State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 30, 458 A.2d 95, 102 (1983) (“primary interest guaranteed by the confrontation clause is the right to cross examination”).

The State concedes that the defendant’s right to counsel had attached as of September, 1986, see State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 368, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983); State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 28-29, 458 A.2d 95, 101-02 (1983), appeal after remand, 125 N.H. 810, 486 A.2d 297 (1984).

Nor do we find support for Bonser’s position in the two State cases he cites, State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 30, 458 A.2d 95, 102 (1983); State v. Settle, 123 N.H. 34, 37, 455 A.2d 1031, 1033 (1983), which hold merely that a trial court may not adopt a blanket policy of refusing to rule on the merits of an evidentiary issue subject to *136 discretionary judgment.

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965); State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 30, 458 A.2d 95, 103 (1983); see U.S. Const. amend.

In her brief, the defendant notes that in State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 32, 458 A.2d 95, 104 (1983), this court followed the Arizona and Louisiana courts in recognizing that “it may be a denial of [a] defendant’s confrontation right to refuse to permit him to impeach an important State witness with his prior criminal conviction.” This passing reference to a “confrontation right” in the

Elimination of the redundancy, see State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 25, 458 A.2d 95, 99 (1983), would leave an indictment charging that a defendant acted with a purpose to cause death with premeditation and deliberation.

State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 27, 458 A.2d 95, 101 (1983) (citing State v. Spero, 117 N.H. at 205, 371 A.2d at 1158).

State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 27, 458 A.2d 95, 100 (1983) (citing State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 134, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973)).

The trial court’s ruling that the State could introduce the defendant’s prior conviction on cross-examination was *626 a proper exercise of discretion.

“A criminal statute is void for vagueness if it 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to *207 its application.’” State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 26, 458 A.2d 95, 100 (1983) (quoting State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973)).

Whether an affiant recklessly misrepresented facts in an affidavit is a question of fact for the trial court.

The questions whether an affidavit contains a misrepresentation and whether the misrepresentation was material are questions of law, for which this court is ultimately responsible, while the issue of the willfulness or recklessness of the misrepresentation is a question of fact for the trial court, which we will not overturn if the finding is supported by the evidence.

A criminal statute is void for vagueness when it ‘“forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 26, 458 A.2d 95, 100 (1983) (quoting State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973)) (citation omitted).

State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 25, 458 A.2d 95, 99 (1983); State v. Bussiere, 118 N.H. 659, 662-63, 392 A.2d 151, 154 (1978).

ch reads: “Every person held to answer in any crime or offense punishable by deprivation of liberty shall have the right to counsel at the expense of the state if need is shown; this right he is at liberty to waive, but only after the matter has been thoroughly explained by the court.” The defendant’s right to assistance of counsel attached no later than the time of his indictment on May 21, 1981.

Because the defendant was under indictment, those protections were in force during the polygraph test here.

The defendant cannot complain that the statute entails an insufficient level of, or definition of, criminal culpability.

This case arose out of the same burglary described in State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 458 A.2d 95 (1983).