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e amount of fees claimed by the Town’s attorneys is reasonably related to the claims [the Town] ‘prevailed’ on, or whether the hourly rate charged by the Town’s law firm is reasonable.” We note initially that while the respondent seems to assume that we have adopted the federal “lodestar” approach to awarding attorney’s fees in all cases, the case he cites in support, Scheele v. Village District, 122 N.H. 1015 (1982), involved a federal claim under 42 U.S.C.

If a defendant files a counterclaim in an action, a second action initiated by the defendant may be precluded on the basis of res judicata if it arises out of the same factual transaction as the counterclaim in the prior suit.

The policy behind collateral estoppel includes considerations of judicial economy and finality in our legal system to avoid repetitive litigation.

mant has couched his arguments in res judicata terms, we note that more precisely he is seeking to apply collateral estoppel, a doctrine we have described as “an extension of res judicata which prevents the same parties, or their privies, from contesting in a subsequent proceeding on a different cause of action any question or fact actually litigated in a prior suit.” Scheele v. Village District, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019, 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982).

Scheele v. Village District, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019, 453 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1982); see MBC, Inc. v. Engel, 119 N.H. 8, 11, 397 A.2d 636, 638 (1979) (cause of action is the underlying right).

“The doctrine of res judicata prevents the parties from relitigating matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first action.” Scheele v. Village District, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019, 453 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1982).

“Considerations of judicial economy and a policy of finality in our legal system have resulted in the development of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to avoid repetitive litigation.” Scheele v. Village District, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019, 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982).

The doctrine of res judicata forbids a party to relitigate in a second action matters actually litigated or matters that could have been litigated in an earlier action between the same parties for the same cause of action.

The rule is derived from its parent doctrine of res judicata, which precludes the litigation in a later case of matters actually litigated, and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the same cause of action.

“The doctrine of res judicata prevents the parties from relitigating matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first action.” Scheele v. Village District, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019, 458 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1982).

USF&G is correct that to the extent any issue was litigated and determined in the declaratory-judgment action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the parties to the first action, or their privies, from relitigating the question in the underlying suits.

.” State v. Proulx, 110 N.H. 187, 189, 263 A.2d 673, 675 (1970); see State v. Hastings, 121 N.H. 465, 467, 430 A.2d 1131, 1132 (1981); see also Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019, 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982).

Seheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019, 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982).