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Thus, we are satisfied that the decision to cross-examine Stowell and expose the defendant to potentially detrimental redirect examination testimony was a “calculated risk falling within the limits of reasonable practice.” Fecteau, 140 N.H. at 502 (quotation omitted) (not constitutionally deficient to open the door to defendant’s prior arrest); State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 949-50 (1982) (not ineffective assistance to open the door to bad character evidence of the defendant).

Fecteau, 133 N.H. at 874, 587 A.2d at 599; State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 949-50, 454 A.2d 422, 426-27 (1982) (holding counsel was not ineffective for making tactical decision to present character evidence in favor of the defendant which opened the door to State’s presentation of evidence of defendant’s bad character, especially when limiting instruction mitigated any potential prejudice)

As we stated in State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 951-52, 454 A.2d 422, 428 (1982), “[t]he policy does not, and is not intended to, result in mandatory dismissal of eases merely because they may exceed the guideline time frames.” We therefore reject the defendant’s contention that the policy guidelines are determinative of this issue and proceed to analyze his spee

State v. Humphrey, 129 N.H. 654, 656, 531 A.2d 329, 331 (1987); State v. Per *602 ron, 122 N.H. 941, 948, 454 A.2d 422, 426 (1982).

lthough the length of time prior to trial is never alone dispositive of a speedy trial claim, see State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 86, 427 A.2d 3, 5 (1981) (thirteen-month delay); see also Barker v. Wingo, supra at 523 (five-year delay), the superior court follows a policy of inquiring into the reasons for delay whenever a felony case remains untried nine months after indictment, State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 951, 454 A.2d 422, 428 (1982), and we will likewise assume that reaching the nine-month

We have stated in prior cases that “[t]he constitutional standard by which we measure the performance of a lawyer in representing his client in a criminal case is ‘reasonable competence.’ ” State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 946, 454 A.2d 422, 424 (1982) (citing State v. Staples, 121 N.H. 959, 961, 437 A.2d 266, 267 (1981)); see Strickland v. Washington, supra at 2065.

We have held that we will not second guess tactical judgments of defense counsel.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972); State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 950, 454 A.2d 422, 427 (1982).

“The constitutional standard by which we measure the performance of a lawyer representing his client in a criminal case is ‘reasonable competence.’” State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. 93, 98, 467 A.2d 233, 236 (1983) (quoting State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 946, 454 A.2d 422, 424 (1982)).

The constitutional standard by which we measure the performance of a lawyer representing his client in a criminal case is ‘reasonable competence.’” State v. Guaraldi, 124 N.H. at 98, 467 A.2d at 236 (quoting State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 946, 454 A.2d 422, 424 (1982)); State v. Staples, 121 N.H. 959, 437 A.2d 266 (1981).

State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 949, 454 A.2d 422, 426 (1982); State v. Butler, 117 N.H. 888, 891-92, 379 A.2d 827, 829-30 (1977); see also People v. Loden, 31 Ill.

State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829, 831, 395 A.2d 189, 190 (1978); see State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 951-52, 454 A.2d 422, 428 (1982).

The constitutional standard by which we measure the performance of a lawyer representing his client in a criminal case is “reasonable competence.” State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 946, 454 A.2d 422, 424 (1982); State v. Staples, supra at 961, 437 A.2d at 267.

We apply this same analysis in determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the New Hampshire Constitution has been violated.

We have held that the right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest or indictment rather than at the time of the offense, State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 950, 454 A.2d 422, 427 (1982); see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1971).

Id.; see also State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 948, 454 A.2d 422, 425 (1982).

State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 950, 454 A.2d 422, 427 (1982); State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 86, 427 A.2d 3, 5 (1981); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

The fact that the jury instruction was given at the close of all the evidence aside, a review of the trial transcript reveals that the defendant himself first raised the issue of intent, see State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 949, 454 A.2d 422, 426 (1982), when he raised the justification defense of self-defense in his trial for negligent homicide.

State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 947, 454 A.2d 422, 425 (1982); State v. Leclair, 118 N.H. 214, 219, 385 A.2d 831, 834 (1978).