Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Danskin, 451 A.2d 396.

14 citing documents.

  • State v. McCue 589 A.2d 580 N.H. 1991
    State v. Cyr, 122 N.H. 1155, 1160, 453 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1982); State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982).
  • State v. Gruber 562 A.2d 156 N.H. 1989
    In addition, we note that a rational trier of fact is “entitled to infer guilt from circumstantial evidence that excludes all other rational conclusions.” Murray, 129 N.H. at 650, 531 A.2d at 327 (citing State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982)).
  • State v. Guay 543 A.2d 910 N.H. 1988
    “The rational trier is, of course, entitled to infer guilt from circumstantial evidence that excludes all other rational conclusions.” Murray, supra at 650, 531 A.2d at 327; State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982).
  • State v. Guglielmo 544 A.2d 25 N.H. 1987
    State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982); State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 624, 486 A.2d 262, 271 (1984); State v. Cyr, 122 N.H. 1155, 1160, 453 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1982).
  • State v. Murray 531 A.2d 323 N.H. 1987
    The rational trier is, of course, entitled to infer guilt from circumstantial evidence that excludes all other rational conclusions.
  • State v. O'Flynn 496 A.2d 348 N.H. 1985
    We will uphold the verdict unless “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)).
  • State v. Ouellette 484 A.2d 1148 N.H. 1984
    In reviewing this evidence, we must uphold *603 the verdicts unless “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)).
  • State v. Cobb 465 A.2d 1203 N.H. 1983
    State v. Cyr, 122 N.H. at 1160, 453 A.2d at 1318; State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982).
  • State v. Holler 459 A.2d 1143 N.H. 1983
    id., 455 A.2d at 1045; State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 819, 451 A.2d 396, 398 (1982).
  • State v. Smith 455 A.2d 1041 N.H. 1983
    State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 819, 451 A.2d 396, 398 (1982); State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 87-88, 427 A.2d 3, 6 (1981).
  • State v. Pugliese 455 A.2d 1018 N.H. 1982
    State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 819, 451 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1982); State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 606, 419 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1980).
  • State v. Cyr 453 A.2d 1315 N.H. 1982
    The evidence will be deemed insufficient only if “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” *1160 State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)); see State v. Goupil, 122 N.H. 859, 451 A.2d at 1286.
  • State v. Condict 455 A.2d 1013 N.H. 1982
    The test we follow is that the evidence will be sufficient if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982); State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 312, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982).
  • State v. Goupil 451 A.2d 1284 N.H. 1982
    Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982); State v. Arillo, 122 N.H. at 109, 441 A.2d at 1164.