Cited by

Like the trial court, the Warden cites Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88 (1982), for the proposition that, because nine years have passed between Mallard’s conviction and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, his petition is untimely.

It “could have disbelieved any part of the testimony” given at the hearing “even if no evidence was introduced to rebut it.” Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 95 (1982).

“The weight to be given testimony depends on the credibility of the witnesses, and the credibility of witnesses is for the trial court to determine.” Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 94 (1982).

State v. Torres, 121 N.H. 828, 830, 435 A.2d 527, 528 (1981); see Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 95, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1982).

We will not reverse a factual finding unless “no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion as to the weight to be given to the conflicting testimony____” Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 95, 441 A.2d 1151, 1156 (1982).

Citing State v. O’Leary, 128 N.H. 661, 665, 517 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1986), we also directed the prosecutor to “make the sentencing recommendation agreed to during negotiations for defendant’s ‘naked plea.’” See generally Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 93, 441 A.2d 1151, 1154 (1982); State v. Goodrich, 116 N.H. 477, 479, 363 A.2d 425, 426 (1976); J. Bond, Plea Bargaining & Guilty Pleas § 6.17(g), at 6-48 (2d ed. 1982); R. McNamara, 2 New Hampshire Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 757, at

State v. Roy, 118 N.H. 2, 381 A.2d 1198 (1978); Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 441 A.2d 1151 (1982).

Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 95, 441 A.2d 1151, 1156 (1982); Taylor v. Gagne, 121 N.H. 948, 949, 437 A.2d 262, 263 (1981).

This court has previously held that “[t]he time to object to any perceived irregularities in the sentencing procedure [is] at the sentencing hearing.” Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 100, 441 A.2d 1151, 1159 (1982).

State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 436-37, 503 A.2d 774, 776 (1985); Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 94, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1982).

This contemporaneous objection rule applies in a proceeding upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 100, 441 A.2d 1151, 1159 (1982), and the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he objected in the appropriate forum, cf. State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 284, 415 A.2d 320, 323-24 (1980) (defendant bears burden of placing on the record indications that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting e

In Roy v. Perrin, when the defendant unjustifiably remained silent for four years prior to raising an objection to his sentencing procedure, he was not permitted to raise the issue in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 97, 441 A.2d 1151, 1157 (1982); State v. Laroche, 117 N.H. 127, 131, 370 A.2d 631, 634 (1977).

Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 97, 441 A.2d 1151, 1157 (1982) (on petition for habeas corpus, clear and convincing evidence necessary to justify withdrawal of guilty plea).

Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 94-95, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155-56 (1982) (citations omitted).

The court recognized that the same test, the Dusky test, is used for deciding whether a defendant is competent to plead not guilty by reason of insanity and for deciding whether a defendant is competent to stand trial.

The petitioner presented no evidence in support of his claim and thus failed to carry his burden to prove entitlement to relief.

In Allard the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the claim that competence to stand trial under Dusky is not necessarily competence to plead guilty, and we likewise rejected the possibility of a dual standard in Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 94, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1982).

We note that the jury could have disbelieved any part of the expert testimony presented by either the defendant or the State.

Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 100, 441 A.2d 1151, 1159 (1982); see Martineau v. Perrin, 119 N.H. 529, 531, 404 A.2d 1100, 1102 (1979); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-89 (1977).

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 97, 441 A.2d 1151, 1157 (1982).

The court may disbelieve the testimony of any witness, even if no evidence is introduced to rebut it.

at 402; cf. Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 94, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1982).

e defendant enjoys this fundamental substantive guarantee not to be tried if he is unable to “consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” or he does not have “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); State v. Stiles, 123 N.H. 680, 684, 465 A.2d 908, 911 (1983); see Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 94, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1982).

While both the plaintiff and defendant testified that the work on the mill walls was within their contemplation, the master was not required to accept this testimony, Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 95, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1982), and could rely on their conduct instead.

State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1980); cf. Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 95, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155-56 (1982) (standard for assessing competency).

RSA 491:17; State v. O’Brien, 114 N.H. 233, 236, 317 A.2d 783, 785 (1974); see Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 100, 441 A.2d 1151, 1159 (1982).

Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 99-100, 441 A.2d 1151, 1158 (1982); State v. Schulte, 119 N.H. 36, 39, 398 A.2d 63, 65 (1979).