Cited by

denied, 483 U.S. 1008 (1988); see State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 814, 486 A.2d 297, 300 (1984); State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 311, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982).

In substance, then, the New Hampshire rule established by Spero is identical to the later federal rule announced in Franks, notwithstanding any suggestion to the contrary in State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 444 A.2d 527 (1982); State v. Doyle, 126 N.H. 153, 489 A.2d 639 (1985); or State v. Stiles, 128 N.H. 81, 512 A.2d 1084 (1986).

The first part of the argument assumes both that we have determined that the omis *429 sion of Eaton’s motive was material and that it was negligently made, and therefore that it must be added to the affidavit, so that the affidavit may be retested.

In State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 444 A.2d 527 (1982), we stated that when the court is presented with misrepresentations that are not reckless or intentional in a search warrant affidavit, the warrant may be held valid if, after excising the misstated facts, sufficient information remains to constitute probable cause to issue a warrant.

After excision of the inaccurate statements, see State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 311, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982), the following contents of the affidavit still established probable cause to search for drugs and drug paraphernalia: the consort of the defendant at the time of his arrest had been found with what appeared to be residue of cocaine upon her person; the same person stated that the defend

In order to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, RSA 318-B:2, the State must prove that the defendant (1) knew the nature of the drug; (2) knew that the drug was in his or her vicinity; and (3) intended to sell or give the drug to another person.

The State had the burden of proving that the defendant possessed drugs with an intent to sell or give them to another person.

State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 311, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982); see Grimaldi v. United States, 606 F.2d 332, 336 (1st Cir.), cert.

State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 311, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982); State v. Spero, 117 N.H. 199, 205, 371 A.2d 1155, 1159 (1977).

In determining the sufficiency of evidence, we must consider all the evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found this statutory mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

at 434, 321 A.2d at 592; see State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 311-12, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982).

State v. Goupil, 122 N.H. 857, 859, 451 A.2d 1284, 1286 (1982); State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 312, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982).

The test we follow is that the evidence will be sufficient if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Danskin, 122 N.H. 817, 818, 451 A.2d 396, 397 (1982); State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 312, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982).

Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, State v. Renfrew, 122 N.H. 308, 312, 444 A.2d 527, 529 (1982); State v. Arillo, 122 N.H. 107, 109, 441 A.2d 1163, 1164 (1982), we cannot say that no reasonable person could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.