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In a civil action, the standard of proof by which the plaintiff must generally prove its case is by a preponderance of the evidence.

Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298 (1982) (“In a civil action the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff to establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Petition of Preisendorfer, 143 N.H. 50, 53 (1998) (preponderance of the evidence standard applied to hearings for child abuse registry listings); New England Ins.

These equitable powers are “broad and flexible,” allowing the family division “to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.” In the Matter of Neal & DiGiulio, 170 N.H. 671, 678 (2018) (quotation omitted); accord Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300 (1982).

See, e.g., Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298 (1982) (“In a civil action the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff.”).

Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298 (1982) (stating in civil action burden of proof is generally preponderance of the evidence).

“To constitute a nuisance, the defendant’s activity must cause harm that exceeds the customary interferences a land user suffers in an organized society, and be an appreciable and tangible interference with a property interest.” Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298 (1982) (quotations and citation omitted).

“The trial court has broad and flexible equitable powers which allow it to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.” Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300 (1982) (quotation omitted); see also N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 783 (1987) (it is historic purpose of equity to secure complete justice and courts may adjust remedies to grant necessary relief).

“A private nuisance exists when an activity substantially and unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of another’s property.” Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298 (1982).

Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298, 444 A.2d 519, 520 (1982); cf. Scott & Fratcher, supra § 492.4, at 458.

Upon remand, the trial court should exercise its broad and flexible equitable powers “to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.” Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 521 (1982) (quotation omitted); Northern N.H. Mental Health v. Cannell, 134 N.H. 519, 522, 593 A.2d 1161, 1163 (1991).

“In a civil action the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff to establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence.” Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298, 444 A.2d 519, 520 (1982).

“The trial court has broad and flexible equitable powers which allow it ‘to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.’” Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 521 (1982) (quoting Webb v. Rye, 108 N.H. 147, 153, 230 A.2d 223, 228 (1967)).

Skandinavia, Inc. v. Cormier, 128 N.H. 215, 222, 514 A.2d 1250, 1255 (1986); Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 522 (1982).

The law in New Hampshire is that damages need not be proven with absolute certainty.

“It is well settled that the trial judge has wide discretion in the admission and exclusion of opinion evidence, and that we will uphold his ruling unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Peters v. McNally, 123 N.H. 438, 440, 462 A.2d 119, 121 (1983); see Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 522 (1982); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980).

ction extends to granting relief from the effects of another person’s fraud when the party wronged seeks other than damages, R. WlEBUSCH, 5 New Hampshire Practice, Civil Practice and Procedure § 2043(7) n.13, at 493 (1984), and although a trial court in the exercise of its equitable powers may “shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation,” Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 521 (1982) (quoting Webb v. Rye, 108 N.H. 147, 153, 230 A.2d 223, 2

Opinion evidence is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact.

Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 522 (1982); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. at 775, 424 A.2d at 172-73.

Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 522 (1982); see Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. at 125, 441 A.2d at 1171.