Cited by

State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 47- 48 (1982) (trial court properly allowed State to cross-examine defendant, over his counsel’s objection, regarding whether he “disputed” testimony of various prosecution witnesses because such questioning did not require the defendant to comment directly on the veracity, as opposed to the correctness, of another w

State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 47-48 (1982) (finding no error in cross-examination of defendant as to whether he “disputed” testimony of various prosecution witnesses because such questioning did not require the defendant “to comment directly on the veracity, as opposed to the correctness, of another witness’s testimony,” “brought the defendant’s

Later, in State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 47 (1982), the defendant was asked whether he disputed the testimony of prior witnesses and the trial court permitted the defendant to answer over defense counsel’s objections.

State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 46 (1982) (where a facial attack is unwarranted, we examine the statutory scheme only as it applies to the facts of the particular case).

State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41,46 (1982); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988) (“Vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.”).

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 46 (1982).

Our task is to construe the Criminal Code provisions “according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice.” RSA 625:3 (1996); cf. State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 45 (1982) (a criminal statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the conduct that it proscribes).

anger of “serious bodily injury.” RSA 631:3, I, provides that a person is guilty of reckless conduct if he recklessly engages in conduct “which places or may place another in danger of serious bodily injury.” “In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 49, 441 A.2d 728, 733 (1982).

.’” State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 48, 441 A.2d 728, 732 (1982) (quoting State v. Carroll, 120 N.H. 458, 460, 417 A.2d 8, 10 (1980)).

A prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from the facts proven, see State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 48, 441 A.2d 728, 732 (1982), and has great latitude in closing argument to both “summarize and discuss the evidence presented to the jury and to urge the jury to draw inferences of guilt from the evidence.” State v. Grote, 127 N.H. 748, 751, 506 A.2d 346, 348 (1986).

He was convicted in November, 1980, of manslaughter, RSA 630:2 (Supp. 1979), and second degree assault, and the convictions were upheld by this court.

Counsel, in closing argument may, however, draw reasonable inferences from the facts proven.

Hence, it is not clear on the face of the record that the plaintiff properly preserved his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling.

*598 State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 48, 441 A.2d 728, 732 (1982); State v. Carroll, 120 N.H. 458, 460, 417 A.2d 8, 10 (1980).

State v. Niquette, 122 N.H. 870, 873-74, 451 A.2d 1292, 1294 (1982); State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 48, 441 A.2d 728, 732 (1982).

The failure to make contemporaneous objections and exceptions generally constitutes a waiver of such objections on appeal.

State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 49, 441 A.2d 728, 733 (1982); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).

.’” State v. Taylor, 121 N.H. at 495-96, 431 A.2d at 779 (citations omitted); see State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 49, 441 A.2d 728, 732 (1982).

State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 48, 441 A.2d 728, 732 (1982); State v. Wonyetye, 122 N.H. 39, 40, 441 A.2d 363, 364 (1982).

While we recognize that the trial court has broad discretion in defining the scope of cross-examination, State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 47, 441 A.2d 728, 731 (1982), we agree with the defendant that the questioning in this case as to his interpretation of unacknowledged statements was inappropriate.

State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 50, 441 A.2d 728, 733 (1982); State v. Martin, 121 N.H. 1032, 1033-34, 437 A.2d 308, 309 (1981); State v. Gilbert, 121 N.H. 305, 313, 429 A.2d 323, 329 (1981).

As this court has stated in State v. Martin, 121 N.H. 1032, 1033-34, 437 A.2d 308, 309 (1981), “[i]n determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we follow the test set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), that the evidence is insufficient if ‘no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Citations omitted.)

Defense counsel did not except to this ruling and thus failed to preserve the issue for our consideration.

The defendant agreed not to remove the “hot” trailer; however, when the police returned the next day pursuant to their agreement with the defendant, the trailer had “disappeared.” The evidence need not be chronicled here, but we conclude that it, as well as all reasonable inferences, meets the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Glidden, 122 N.H. 41, 49, 441 A.2d 728, 733 (1982).

To preserve issues for our consideration, counsel must take contemporaneous objections and exceptions.