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The requirement of reasonable foreseeability may be satisfied in either of two ways: (1) as a matter of law if the damages follow the breach in the ordinary course of events; or (2) by the claimant specifically proving that the breaching party had reason to know the facts and to foresee injury.

Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 127 (1982) (holding that unjust enrichment may follow from wrongful acts or where one “innocently receives a benefit and passively accepts it”).

V In the absence of a valid and enforceable contract, and after correctly finding that Wyner could not waive the anti-assignment clause, the trial court properly entered summary judgment for Singer on its claim that Wyner had been unjustly enriched by its cash advances.

While T&M argues that the court committed legal error by relying upon the S&P 500 Index without explaining why it selected this index over any other possible index, such explanation is generally not required.

Furthermore, we will not disturb the decision of the fact-finder unless it is clearly erroneous.” Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 124, 441 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1982) (quotation and citations omitted).

In reviewing the trial court’s denial of lost profits, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant because it prevailed below.

We view the evidence in a light most favorable to IMC and affirm the jury’s verdict if there is sufficient evidence in the record to support it.

We recognize that “[t]he law does not require absolute certainty for recovery of damages.” Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 125, 441 A.2d 1167, 1171 (1982) (quotation omitted).

In reviewing damages awards, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we will not disturb the decision of the fact-finder unless it is clearly erroneous.

Where, as in the present case, no express contractual relationship exists between the parties, “a trial court may require an individual to make restitution for unjust enrichment if he has received a benefit [that] would be unconscionable to retain.” Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 127, 441 A.2d 1167, 1171 (1982).

A review of two cases previously handed down by this court further aids our interpretation of the word “relocate.” In both Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 125-26, 441 A.2d 1167, 1170-71 (1982) and Thompson v. Poirier, 120 N.H. 584, 587, 420 A.2d 297, 299 (1980), which involved business evictions from leased premises, the word “relocate” is used to describe circumstances in which business owners ceased all business activity at one site to establish their businesses on

The defendant next claims that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the plaintiff could not recover commissions for the aborted sales of the two adjoining tracts without proof that the defendant had reason to foresee that such injury would follow from a refusal to complete the sale of his own land.

We have previously held that “in reviewing damage awards, we will consider the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.’ ” Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 124, 441 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1982) (quoting Martin v. Phillips, 122 N.H. 34, 37, 440 A.2d 1124, 1126 (1982)).

“In the absence of a contractual agreement, a trial court may require an individual to make restitution for unjust enrichment if he has received a benefit which would be unconscionable to retain.” Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 127, 441 A.2d 1167, 1171 (1982).

Consequential damages are reasonably foreseeable losses that flow from a breach of contract.

He may have intended to allude to the rule that absolute mathematical certainty is not required for a valid damage award.

687, 690 (1884), or ask for restitution, Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 127, 441 A.2d 1167, 1171-72 (1982).

Consequently, we shall remand for a calculation of the amount by which the City was unjustly enriched by its having received the benefit of the house service connections without having paid for them.

*1113 A trial court may require an individual to make restitution for unjust enrichment if he has received a benefit which would be unconscionable for him to retain.

Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 124, 441 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1982); M. W. Goodell Const. Co., Inc. v. Monadnock Skating Club, Inc., 121 N.H. 320, 323, 429 A.2d 329, 331 (1981).

Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. *384 120, 124, 441 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1982); see Martin v. Phillips, 122 N.H. 34, 37, 440 A.2d 1124, 1125-26 (1982).

We recently held that “[t]he focus is not upon the cost to the [breaching] plaintiff, but rather it is upon the value of what was actually received by the defendants.” Martin v. Phillips, 122 N.H. 34, 440 A.2d 1124 (1982); Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 127, 441 A.2d 1167, 1172 (1982).

The master’s ruling is consistent with New Hampshire law.