Cited by

It declined to specify that the alimony terminates upon the death of either spouse because, citing Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063 (1981), “alimony generally does not continue if one of the parties dies.” The 4 trial court noted that the Wife recognized that her cohabitation could justify a modification of alimony and it granted the Husband’s request that the Wife promptly notify him if she begins

Non- modifiable property settlements include “the duty to make mortgage payments and the obligation to establish a trust fund and maintain life insurance policies.” 3 C. Douglas, New Hampshire Practice, Family Law § 13.84, at 13- 118 (4th ed. 2014); see also Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063 (1981).

Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1061-62, 438 A.2d 295, 297 (1981) (establishing trust funds under terms of divorce decree).

Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063, 438 A.2d 295, 297 (1981) (property settlement involves final distribution of property in contrast to alimony and child support, which remain modifiable by court).

We have consistently held that ‘“unless otherwise provided, support payments terminate upon the death of either spouse, and the estates of the spouses have no rights or responsibilities concerning these payments.’” Dupuis v. Click, 135 N.H. 333, 335, 604 A.2d 576, 577 (1992) (quoting Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063, 438 A.2d 295, 297-98 (1981)).

generally McSherry v. McSherry, 135 N.H. 451, 453, 606 A.2d 311, 313 (1992); Dupuis v. Click, 135 N.H. 333, 604 A.2d 576, (1992); Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1062-63, 438 A.2d 295, 297-298 (1981).

[and] is not subject to judicial modification on account of changed circumstances.” Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063, 438 A.2d 295, 297 (1981) (citations omitted); see Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968) (court lacks authority to modify property settlement portion of divorce decree).

generally Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1062-63, 438 A.2d 295, 297-98 (1981) (and cases cited therein).

The Dubois brothers claim that the law is different in this State, and cite Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 438 A.2d 295 (1981), to support their proposition that a beneficiary interest is akin to a vested property right.

See, e.g., Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1064, 438 A.2d 295, 298 (1981); Pindar v. Pindar, 109 N.H. 76, 77, 242 A.2d 76, 77 (1968).

He claims that the order amounted to a modification of the property settlement, which is otherwise only available upon a showing of fraud, and which is not subject to judicial modification on account of changed circumstances.

Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063, 438 A.2d 295, 297 (1981); Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968).

On the contrary, the stipulated provision for establishment of the trust was intended to benefit the parties’ minor children, whose rights we do not determine in this opinion.

Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063, 438 A.2d 295, 297-98 (1982); see 2 NELSON, DIVORCE and Annulment § 14.02, at 7 (2d ed. 1961).